Cognitive penetration and the perceptual representation of high-level properties by Piatti, Katherine Anne
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright 
by 
Katherine Anne Piatti 
2017 
 
 
  
The Dissertation Committee for Katherine Anne Piatti Certifies that this is the 
approved version of the following dissertation: 
 
 
Cognitive Penetration and the Perceptual Representation of High-Level 
Properties 
 
 
 
 
 
Committee: 
 
Michael Tye, Supervisor 
Michelle Montague 
Ernest D Sosa 
Joshua Dever 
Susanna Siegel 
Cognitive Penetration and the Perceptual Representation of High-Level 
Properties 
 
 
by 
Katherine Anne Piatti, B.A; M.A. 
 
 
 
Dissertation 
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of  
The University of Texas at Austin 
in Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirements 
for the Degree of  
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
The University of Texas at Austin 
May, 2017
iv 
 
Cognitive Penetration and the Perceptual Representation of High-Level 
Properties 
 
Katherine Anne Piatti, Ph.D. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2016 
 
Supervisor:  Michael Tye 
 
In recent years, two of the most popular debates in the philosophy of perception have 
been about whether there’s cognitive penetration and whether high-level properties are 
represented in our perceptual experiences. My dissertation concerns both of those debates. In the 
first paper, I argue that the debates about cognitive penetration and the perceptual representation 
of high-level properties are related. Namely, there has to be cognitive penetration for it to be 
plausible that our perceptual experiences represent high-level properties. In the second paper, I 
add to the literature challenging the alleged empirical evidence for cognitive penetration. I focus, 
in particular, on studies purportedly finding that (direct) influence from subjects cognitive states 
had altered their perceptual experiences over time. I argue those studies provide empirical 
evidence of perceptual adaptation, not cognitive penetration.  In the third paper, I argue the view 
that our visual experiences represent high-level properties is unmotivated and I argue the 
explanation for how we come to perceptually represent high-level properties is implausible.
 v 
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Chapter 1: No High-Level (Perceptual) Representation, Without 
Cognitive Penetration 
Looking at a contour map, the student sees lines on paper, the cartographer a picture of a terrain. Looking at a 
bubble-chamber photograph, the student sees confused and broken lines, the physicist a record of familiar subnuclear 
events. Kuhn, 1970: 111 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Two of the hottest debates in the philosophy of perception, in recent years, have been over whether 
high-level properties are represented in our perceptual experiences (see e.g. Hawley and 
Macpherson, 2011; Siegel, 2006) and whether our thoughts can directly influence or alter our 
perceptual experiences (see e.g. Raftopoulos, 2009; Pylyshyn, 1999) . The first is the debate over the 
existence of high-level (perceptual) representations and the second is the debate over the existence of 
cognitive penetration. 
I am skeptical of the existence of both high-level representations and cognitive penetration. 
However, for the purposes of this paper, I am going to set my doubts aside. My aim in this essay is 
to argue that the debate over high-level representations is connected to the debate over cognitive 
penetration. In particular, I will argue that it’s implausible that there are high-level representations if 
there’s no cognitive penetration. 
I have two main arguments. My first argument is based on the premise that the perceptual 
representation of high-level properties plausibly requires the possession and application of high-level 
property concepts. For example, it’s plausible that for an individual to perceptually represent the 
property of being a pine tree, she needs to possess the concept PINE TREE and be disposed to 
apply that concept to her experiences. In short, it’s plausible that perceptual experiences 
representing high-level properties have (or would have) conceptual contents. And I argue if 
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perceptual experiences representing high-level properties have conceptual contents, then subjects 
can’t come to perceptually represent high-level properties without their cognitive states directly 
influencing their perceptual experiences.  
My second argument is based on the premise that the plausibility of there being high-level 
representations is contingent upon there being a plausible account of how subjects come to 
perceptually represent high-level properties. And I will argue that the only plausible account in the 
offing is in terms of cognitive penetration. 
The remainder of the paper will proceed as follows. In the next section, I will summarize the 
debate over the existence of high-level representations, and present the main argument that’s been 
put forward in their favor—the phenomenal contrast argument. In section 3, I will summarize the 
debate over cognitive penetration, and discuss how high-levelists have appealed to cognitive 
penetration in arguing for their view. In section 4, I will present my arguments and respond to a few 
potential objections. In section 5, I will offer some concluding remarks. 
1.2 HIGH-LEVEL (PERCEPTUAL) REPRESENTATION 
As I sit here typing these words, I am having a variety of perceptual experiences—e.g. I am 
feeling the pressure of the floor beneath my feet, I am hearing the tick-tick-tick of my wall clock, I 
am seeing a half-full mug of coffee on my desk, I am smelling coffee, and I am tasting the sweet-
minty flavor of the gum I am chewing.  
Many contemporary philosophers think our perceptual experiences, like our beliefs and 
other attitudes, are mental states that represent the world as being some way or other, and thus are 
either accurate or inaccurate (our experiences are accurate if they represent the world a way it 
actually is, and inaccurate if they represent it some way it is not). The content of a state is a 
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specification of the way it represents the world as being. So, for example, the belief that the Milky 
Way is a galaxy represents and has the content that the Milky Way is a galaxy.  
While many contemporary philosophers may agree that our perceptual experiences are 
representational and thus have contents, there is a lot of disagreement among them over the nature 
of those contents (see Siegel, 2016). Are they structured? Unstructured? Propositional? Non-
propositional? Sets of Possible Worlds? Fregean? Russellian? Existential? Singular? Gappy? The 
debate over high-level representations concerns a disagreement about whether certain properties—
namely, high-level properties—can figure in the contents of our experiences (i.e. whether our 
perceptual experiences represent high-level properties). 
Take the perceptual experiences I was having as I typed the first few lines of this section.  To 
keep things manageable, let’s focus on my visual experience, which I described as “seeing a half-full 
mug of coffee sitting on my desk”. There are lots of things you might want to know about that 
experience: was it veridical (and accurate) or hallucinatory (and inaccurate), what (if anything) was it 
an experience of (i.e. what were its objects), did the fact that I was focused on what I was writing 
and not my experience have an effect on my experience? Something else you might want to know is 
what properties did my experience represent? 
There is widespread agreement that the experience represented sensible qualities or low-level 
properties like the color of the coffee, the shape of the mug, and the spatial relationship between the 
mug and the desk. But what about so-called high-level properties like being a mug, being a desk, and 
being coffee? Does my visual experience represent those properties too? A somewhat indirect way 
of getting at the same question is to ask whether my experience would have been inaccurate or illusory 
if, instead of coffee, the mug had actually contained cola. 
The orthodox view (if there is one) is that our perceptual experiences can only represent 
“sensible qualities” like color, shape, pitch, tone, pressure, and texture properties.  So on the 
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orthodox view my experience could only have represented properties like the color of the coffee and 
the shape of the mug. However, a handful of philosophers have rejected the orthodoxy, and 
contend that our perceptual experiences can also represent (some) high-level properties (e.g. 
McClelland, 2016; Siegel, 2010). On this view, my experience could also have represented the 
properties of being coffee and being a mug.  Since I’m calling perceptual experiences that represent 
high-level properties high-level representations, this can be understood as a debate over the existence of 
high-level representations.  I’ll call those who believe in the existence of high-level representations, 
high-levelists, and those who deny their existence (i.e. believe that our perceptual experiences only 
represent low-level properties) low-levelists. 
You might be tempted to think high-levelists are right since I obviously see more than colors 
and shapes (and other low-level properties), I see a mug of coffee. That’s true as far as it goes. But it 
doesn’t go far enough. I see a mug of coffee in the sense that a mug of coffee is the object of my 
experience. But no one—least of all low-levelists—contends that the objects of our experiences are 
just colors and shapes. But seeing a mug of coffee doesn’t require visually representing the high-level 
properties of being a mug and being coffee. So, the fact that I see a mug of coffee doesn’t support 
the claim that my visual experience represented those high-level properties. I also know that I’m 
seeing a mug of coffee (I filled the mug, and set it there myself). But I can know I’m seeing a mug of 
coffee without visually representing the properties of being a mug and being coffee. 
Some high-levelists contend that common sense is on their side. They claim it’s common 
sense that high-level properties are represented in our perceptual experiences. But that’s just false. 
It’s not false because it’s common sense that only low-level properties are represented in our 
perceptual experiences. That’s not common sense either. It’s false because there is no common 
sense view about which properties are visually represented. 
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1.1.1 Phenomenal Contrast Arguments for High-level Representation 
High-levelists have tried to establish that high-level properties are represented in our perceptual 
experiences (i.e. the existence of high-level representations) using phenomenal contrast arguments (e.g. 
Bayne, 2011; Siegel, 2007; Siewert, 1998).1 These arguments start by describing a pair of situations in 
which it seems like subjects have (or would have) perceptual experiences that differ, but where it 
doesn’t seem like those perceptual experiences could be representing different low-level properties. 
High-levelists then argue that the best (or perhaps only) way to explain/account for subjects 
(purportedly) having different perceptual experiences in these pairs of situations is that their 
perceptual experiences were representing different high-level properties. But if the explanation is 
that different high-level properties were represented in subjects’ perceptual experiences, it must be 
the case that our perceptual experiences can represent high-level properties, and thus that there are 
high-level representations. 
For the phenomenal contrast arguments to have any chance of success, the audience has to 
find it plausible both that subjects’ perceptual experiences would be different in the situations in 
question, and that the difference(s) between subjects’ perceptual experiences can’t be explained in 
terms of differences in what low-level properties those perceptual experiences represent. High-
levelists have described a number of different cases in arguing for (the existence of) high-level 
representations. But the most prominent examples either have to do with, what we might call, expert 
perception or with our perceptual experiences of ambiguous figures.  
Expert perception is the phenomenon whereby gaining knowledge/expertise in a certain 
domain alters (improves) one’s perceptual experiences of things within that domain—e.g. when 
becoming a wine expert alters or improves how wines taste to you (i.e. your taste experiences of 
                                                
1 Phenomenal contrast arguments have also been used in other areas of philosophy (e.g. Chudnoff, 2015). For 
criticism of phenomenal contrast arguments see Koksvik, 2015. 
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wine), when becoming a radiologist alters how x-rays look to you (i.e. your visual experiences of x-
rays), and when becoming a musician alters how music sounds to you (i.e. your auditory experiences 
of music). Siegel describes a pair of cases where becoming a pine tree expert (of a sort) alters how 
pine trees look to you (i.e. your visual experiences of pine trees). 
Suppose you have never seen a pine tree before and are hired to cut down all the pine trees in 
a grove containing trees of many different sorts. Someone points out to you which trees are 
pine trees. Some weeks pass, and your disposition to distinguish the pine trees from the others 
improves. Eventually, you can spot the pine trees immediately: they become visually salient to 
you. Like the recognitional disposition you gain, the salience of the trees emerges gradually. 
Gaming this recognitional disposition is reflected in a phenomenological difference between 
the visual experiences had before and those had after the recognitional disposition was fully 
developed (Siegel, 2010: 100). 
 
Compare your visual experiences of the trees you had before and after you learned to recognize pine 
trees (i.e. as a novice, and then as an expert). According to Siegel, those visual experiences are 
different, and she contends that’s because pine trees look different to you as an expert from how 
they did to you as a novice. 
There are lots of banal reasons why pine trees might look different to you, after you learned 
to recognize pine trees – e.g. perhaps the weather conditions were different, or maybe your eyesight 
changed, or very plausibly, after learning to recognize pine trees, you attended to them in a very 
different way. However, those kinds of differences don’t exist in the cases Siegel has in mind. In 
other words, we are supposed to be comparing the visual experiences you would have in situations 
that are identical, except for the difference in your ability to recognize pine trees by sight. 
If we suppose that abilities to recognize things (e.g. pine trees) can be cashed out in terms of 
some kind of cognitive state(s) (e.g. know how), then the circumstances in question apparently only 
differ with respect to your cognitive states. And if the circumstances only differ with respect to your 
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product in the states, it doesn’t seem like your visual experiences could be representing different 
low-level properties. 
So, high-levelists contend that the difference between your visual experience before and after 
learning to recognize pine trees is the result of a difference in the high-level properties your visual 
experiences are representing. More specifically, the claim is that your visual experiences are different 
because, after learning to recognize pine trees, you came to visually represent the property of being a 
pine tree. Supposedly, learning to recognize pine trees gave you the ability to visually represent a 
property—namely, being a pine tree—that you could not perceptually represent before .2 
Some of the other cases high-levelists have discussed are drawn from our perceptual 
experiences of ambiguous figures like Wittgenstein’s duck-rabbit (Figure 1).3 Compare your visual 
experience of the figure looking like a duck to your visual experience of the figure looking like a 
rabbit. According to high-levelists, those visual experiences are different, i.e. the figure looks 
different when it looks like a duck versus when it looks like a rabbit. 
 
 
Figure 1: Wittgenstein’s Duck-Rabbit 
 
We find the fact that ambiguous figures can take on different looks surprising and delightful because 
nothing about the figure has changed (and, in a sense, it looks exactly the same). But what makes our 
                                                
2 Of course you could conceptually represent the property.  
3 See, e.g., Price, 2009. 
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experiences of ambiguous figures surprising and delightful is also what makes them fodder for high-
levelists. Like cases involving novice and expert perception, cases involving disambiguated 
experiences of ambiguous figures seem to be cases where subjects have perceptual experiences that 
are different, and it doesn’t seem like there are differences in the low-level properties their 
perceptual experiences are representing.  
As with (purported) experiential differences associated with expert perception, there are 
banal reasons why disambiguated experiences of ambiguous figures might be different. However, 
since we can flip back and forth between the disambiguate experiences – e.g. between the experience 
of the figure looking like a duck and the experience of the figure looking like a rabbit – banal 
explanations are not as forthcoming. Since we can switch back and forth in real time, we can ensure 
there are no differences in the lighting conditions, our eyesight, and, perhaps even, our attention. 
High-levelists contend that your visual experience of seeing the figure as a duck is different from 
your visual experience of seeing the figure as a rabbit because your experiences are representing 
different high-level properties—the property of being a duck, in the one case, and the property of 
being a rabbit, in the other. In other words, when the figure looks to you like a duck, that’s because 
your visual experience is representing the property of being a duck, and when the figure looks to you 
like a rabbit, that’s because your visual experience is representing the property of being a rabbit. 
If phenomenal contrast arguments are successful, there are differences between our 
perceptual experiences that can best (or perhaps only) be explained/accounted for in terms 
of differences in high-level properties those experiences represent. And if that's the case, 
there are high-level (perceptual) representations.4  
                                                
4 There is a real question as to whether the phenomenal contrast arguments are successful. Low-levelists have 
objected to these arguments either by denying that subjects would have different perceptual experiences in 
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1.3 COGNITIVE PENETRATION 
The debate over high-level representations has to do with the contents of our perceptual experiences 
– whether high-level properties can figure in those contents. The debate over cognitive penetration 
also has to do with the contents of our perceptual experiences – whether those contents can be 
(directly) influenced/altered by our cognitive states (see e.g. Stokes, 2013; Wu, 2013; Zeimbekis, 
2013).  
It’s uncontroversial that the contents of our perceptual experiences are directly 
influenced/altered by the objects of our experiences (e.g. the properties they have), our perspective 
on those objects (e.g. how far away they are), the condition/state of our perceptual systems and 
sensory organs (e.g. the acuity of our eyes), the way we distribute and focus our attention (e.g. 
whether we are distracted), and the surrounding environment (e.g. the lighting conditions). But 
proponents of cognitive penetration contend that what we think (e.g. our beliefs, and desires, 
intentions, and expectations) can also directly influence/alter the contents of our perceptual 
experiences.5 
It’s uncontroversial that our thoughts can indirectly influence/alter the contents of our 
perceptual experiences. Suppose you look in the cupboard because you want a cookie and believe 
there are cookies in the cupboard. The visual experience you have while looking in the cupboard has 
to do with your thoughts in two obvious respects: (i) it is because of your thoughts (namely, that you 
want a cookie and believe there are cookies in the cupboard) that you are looking in the cupboard—
and the visual experience you have depends on where you are looking—and (ii) presumably what 
you are thinking also influences what you’re paying attention to and what you’re ignoring—and the 
                                                                                                                                                       
the contrast cases, or by accepting there are differences but denying those differences would be best 
explained in terms of differences in high-level properties being represented in their perceptual experiences. 
5 The debate over cognitive penetration can also be understood as a debate about our mental architecture, 
specifically, whether our perceptual systems are modular or informationally encapsulated. For the classic defense of 
the thesis that our perceptual systems are modular see Fodor, 1983.  
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contents of your visual experience also depends on what you’re paying attention to. But opponents 
of cognitive penetration maintain that once you are looking in the cupboard, it doesn’t matter what 
you’re thinking—the content of your visual experience (i.e. the way things look to you at that 
moment) is fully determined by the things in the cupboard, your viewing perspective, your 
perceptual systems and sensory organs, the way you focus and distribute your attention, the 
surrounding environment, and perhaps how you are related to your environment (e.g. your 
evolutionary history). To put it differently, once you are looking in the cupboard and attending, say, 
to the jar of cookies,  it makes no difference what you think. 
But proponents of cognitive penetration contend that our thoughts can directly 
influence/alter the contents of our perceptual experiences. Suppose you spot a plain sugar cookie 
while looking in the cupboard. According to proponents of cognitive penetration, how that cookie 
looks to you, can be directly influenced/altered by what you think, and thus how it looks to you 
depends on what you think. If, for example, you really want a peanut butter cookie, your desire for a 
peanut butter cookie could make the sugar cookie you see look slightly bigger and browner than it 
actually is (and presumably also bigger and browner than it would have looked to you if you hadn't 
really wanted a peanut butter cookie).  
The primary support for believing there’s cognitive penetration is empirical studies 
purportedly finding that influence from subjects’ cognitive states had somehow altered their 
perceptual experiences. For example, a study purportedly finding that subjects’ expectations about 
the color bananas had altered their visual experiences of black and white images of bananas—i.e. 
made them look slightly yellow (when they we objectively achromatic).6 And a study reported the 
finding that children’s desires for money had altered their visual experiences of coins – making the 
coins look slightly bigger than they actually were (Bruner and Goodman, 1947). 
                                                
6 Study discussed in Deroy, 2013. 
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These studies, and dozens of others like them, have convinced some philosophers that the contents 
of our perceptual experiences are (at times) directly influenced or altered by our cognitive states – 
and thus that there is cognitive penetration. Of course, whether any of those alleged empirical 
findings are, in fact, convincing evidence of cognitive penetration is up for debate.7 And for what it’s 
worth, I’m unconvinced. But might aim in this essay is not to argue against the existence of 
cognitive penetration. It’s to argue that there can’t be high-level representations unless there’s 
cognitive penetration. 
1.4 Cognitive Penetration & High-level Representation  
There are ongoing debates in the philosophy of perception about whether high-level properties 
figure in the contents of our perceptual experiences (i.e. whether there are high-level 
representations), and whether our cognitive states can directly influence/alter the contents of our 
perceptual experiences (i.e. whether there’s cognitive penetration). Those debates are far from 
settled, but I don’t intend to weigh in on them directly. Instead, my aim is to argue that they are 
related. More specifically, that the existence of high-level representations is dependent on the 
existence of cognitive penetration – if there is no cognitive penetration, there are no high-level 
representations. 
 
1.4.1 Argument from Conceptual Content 
Imagine that you are looking at a vegetable garden on a clear sunny day and a ripe green zucchini 
catches your eye. At that moment, even if you have no idea what you’re looking at – you have never 
                                                
7 For criticism of the empirical studies, see Firestone, 2013 & 2014, and Firestone and Scholl, 2016. 
 12 
heard of or seen a zucchini before – you will be having visual experience of a zucchini. However, 
presumably, you won’t be thinking or believing that you are having a visual experience of a zucchini. 
To think or believe that you are having a visual experience of a zucchini is to have a thought or 
belief that has the content that you are having a visual experience of a zucchini. But you can’t have a 
thought or belief with that content unless you have at least some idea that you’re looking at a 
zucchini. And in order to have some idea that you’re looking at a zucchini, you have to possess the 
concept ZUCCHINI. That’s because our thoughts and beliefs are mental states that represent the 
world in a conceptual way, and thus are mental states that have conceptual contents. A mental state 
M has conceptual contents if and only if (i) M has accuracy conditions and (ii) in order to have or be 
in M, subjects need to possess and apply the concepts that would be used in a canonical 
specification of M’s accuracy conditions. 
My first argument begins with the premise that perceptual experiences representing high-
level properties (i.e. high-level representations) are the same as thoughts and beliefs in that they have 
(or would have, if they existed) conceptual contents. In order for you to have a visual experience 
that represents the property of being a zucchini, you would need to possess the concept 
ZUCCHINI and apply that concept to your visual experience. But I argue if high-level 
representations must have conceptual contents, then there can’t be high-level representations 
without cognition directly influencing perception. And thus there can’t be high-level representations 
without cognitive penetration. Here’s the argument in full. 
1) High-level representations have conceptual contents. 
2) If high-level representations have conceptual contents, then subjects need to possess high-
level property concepts and be disposed to apply those concepts when undergoing the 
relevant perceptual experiences, for those perceptual experiences to represent high-level 
properties. 
3) So, subjects need to possess high-level property concepts and be disposed to apply those 
concepts when undergoing the relevant perceptual experiences, for those perceptual 
experiences to represent high-level properties. 
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4) But possessing high-level property concepts and being disposed to apply those concepts to 
your perceptual experiences are matters of having and/or being in certain cognitive states. 
5) So, subjects need to have and/or be in certain cognitive states for their perceptual 
experiences to represent high-level properties. 
6) But if subjects need to have and/or be in certain cognitive states for their perceptual 
experiences to represent high-level properties, there can’t be high-level representations 
without one’s cognitive states directly influencing or altering one’s perceptual experiences. 
7) But cognitive penetration just is cognitive states directly influencing or altering perceptual 
experiences. 
8) So, there can't be high-level representations without cognitive penetration. 
 
The only substantive premises of this argument are 1, 4, and 6. And, of those, I take it that only 
premises 1 and 6 are debatable. Let me say a bit in defense of each.  
Again, premise (1) is the claim that perceptual experiences representing high-level properties 
have (or would have, if they existed) conceptual contents. And that’s because perceptual experiences 
representing high-level properties are, I claim, like thoughts and beliefs in that in order for subjects 
to have or be in those mental states, they would need to possess certain concepts and apply those 
concepts to their perceptual experiences. For premise (1) to be false, it would have to be the case 
that subjects’ perceptual experiences sometimes represent high-level properties for which subjects 
lack the relevant high-level property concepts and/or fail to apply the relevant concepts to their 
perceptual experiences. 
I find the claim that high-level representations have (or would have) conceptual contents 
exceedingly plausible—at least as plausible as the claim that thoughts and beliefs have conceptual 
contents. Consider again the visual experience you would have on a clear sunny day while looking at 
a ripe green zucchini dangling from a vine. What properties would that experience represent? 
Assuming your vision is good and your view is unobstructed (i.e. you see the zucchini clearly), then 
no matter what you believe or what concepts you possess or apply to your experience, we can 
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assume that your visual experience would represent the color and shape properties, as well some 
other low-level properties, of the things you see (e.g. the property of being green).  
But what about the high-level property of being a zucchini, would your visual experience 
represent that? According to high-levelists, it might. However, I take it that’s only plausible on the 
assumption that you at least possess the concept ZUCCHINI and are inclined to, in some sense, 
apply that concept to your experience. But if we suppose that you haven’t the faintest idea what a 
zucchini is – have never heard of or seen one before in your life – it’s not even remotely plausible 
that your visual experience would represent the property of being the zucchini. How the heck could 
it do that? 
Presumably, our mental states only represent those properties they have somehow glommed 
onto or detected. If you know what the zucchini is (and thus possess the concept ZUCCHINI), then 
perhaps your visual system could use that knowledge to parse or group incoming sensory 
information in such a way that allows it to glom onto or detect the property of being as zucchini. 
However, I don’t see how your visual experience (or the underlying visual state of which it is an 
experience of) could have glommed onto or detected the property of being a zucchini is you have no 
idea what a zucchini is. So I conclude that your visual experience could not have (and thus would 
not have) represented the property of being a zucchini unless you had possessed and applied your 
concept ZUCCHINI. 
Another reason to think that high-level representations have (or what have) conceptual 
contents is that all of the cases that high-levelists have appealed to in arguing for their view – i.e. all 
the cases in which subjects’ perceptual experiences purportedly represent high-level properties – are 
cases in which subjects both possess high-level property concepts and apply those concepts to their 
relevant perceptual experiences. So, for example, Siegel argues that the experts visual experience of 
pine trees is different from the novice’s visual experience of pine trees because the expert’s visual 
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experience represents, whereas the novice’s does not, the property of being a pine tree. But she 
contends that the expert’s perceptual experience came to represent the property of being a pine tree 
as a result of her learning to recognize pine trees by sight. But if the expert can recognize pine trees 
by sight, she possesses the concept PINE TREE and she applies that concept to her visual 
experience of pine trees. 
This also applies to cases involving ambiguous figures. High-levelists contend that the visual 
experience you have when Wittgenstein’s duck rabbit looks to you like a duck is different from the 
visual experience you have when the figure looks to you like a rabbit, because in the first case your 
visual experience is representing the property of being a duck, whereas in the second case your 
visual experience is representing the figure as being a rabbit. But their claim is that when your visual 
experience represents those properties it’s because you’re thinking of the figure as a duck or you’re 
thinking of the figure as a rabbit. What if you’re thinking of the figure in those ways, you possess the 
concepts DUCK and RABBIT and are applying those concepts to your visual experiences. 
If it were possible for our perceptual experiences to represent high-level properties even 
when we lack the relevant high-level property concepts or failed to apply those concepts to our 
perceptual experiences, you would expect high-levelists to have discussed some cases like that. The 
fact that they don’t is some reason to believe that such cases aren’t possible. At this point, you might 
be thinking that high-levelists do discuss such cases – namely, cases in which subjects’ perceptual 
experiences purportedly represent causal, linguistic, and facial properties. But for reasons I will 
discuss in section 4.4, cases in which subjects’ perceptual experiences purportedly represent causal, 
linguistic, and facial properties don’t count (i.e. are not counterexamples to this point). 
One final reason that I want to mention for thinking that high-level representations have (or 
would have) conceptual contents concerns how high-levelists have motivated their view. As I 
mentioned when presenting the view (in section 2), the primary motivation high-levelists have given 
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us for thinking there are high-level representations is the existence of contrast cases, i.e. pairs of 
cases in which subjects seem to have perceptual experiences that are different, yet in which subjects’ 
perceptual experiences don’t seem to be representing different low-level properties. High-levelists 
use these pairs of cases to argue that the best (and perhaps only) way to explain subjects 
(purportedly) having different perceptual experiences in these pairs of cases is that their perceptual 
experiences represent different high-level properties. Because subjects’ perceptual experiences can’t 
represent different high-level properties unless it’s the case that high-level properties are (sometimes) 
represented in our perceptual experiences. 
In all the contrast cases high-levelists discuss, there are obvious cognitive differences 
between subjects in the relevant pairs of cases (e.g. differences in the high-level concepts subjects 
applied to their perceptual experiences). And in all the contrast cases these cognitive differences 
between subjects are the only obvious differences there are. In other words, apart from the cognitive 
differences between subjects, the relevant cases are supposed to be identical. There’s a good reason 
for that. The phenomenal contrast arguments only work if it’s plausible that in the contrast cases 
subjects would have perceptual experiences that are different and the best (or only) explanation for 
subjects’ perceptual experiences being different is that they were representing different high-level 
properties. So for these arguments to even get off the ground it has to be plausible that there are 
differences in subjects’ perceptual experiences despite the fact that there are no obvious differences 
in which low-level properties those experiences were representing. 
It is most plausible that both conditions are met if the pairs of cases involve situations that 
only obviously differ from one another in terms of subjects’ cognitive states and yet subjects seem to 
have different perceptual experiences. Because if the situations only differ from one another in 
terms of subjects’ cognitive states, there doesn’t seem to be any basis for difference(s) in lower-level 
properties perceptually represented.  
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This poses a dilemma. Either the only difference between the contrast cases is with respect 
to subjects’ cognitive states or there are some noncognitive differences between the contrast cases as 
well. If the only difference(s) were with respect to subjects’ cognitive states (and yet their perceptual 
experiences were different), then presumably the differences in subjects’ cognitive states were 
somehow responsible for subjects’ perceptual experiences being different. But if there were 
noncognitive differences between the contrast cases, that undermines the claim that there couldn’t 
be differences in low-level properties perceptually represented to explain/account for subjects’ 
perceptual experiences being different. 
But it should be uncontroversial that possessing high-level property concepts and applying 
those concepts to one’s perceptual experiences are matters of cognition, i.e. involve or are 
constituted by having and/or being in certain cognitive states. And if high-level properties can only 
be represented in one’s perceptual experiences if and when she has or is in certain cognitive states, 
high-level properties can’t be represented in her perceptual experiences without her cognitive states 
having a direct influence on or altering her perceptual experiences. But cognitive states having a 
direct influence on or altering perceptual experiences just is cognitive penetration. So there can’t be 
perceptual experiences representing high-level properties without cognitive penetration. 
1.4.2 Objections and Replies 
First Objection. Premise (1) of your argument is false. High-level representations don’t (or wouldn’t) 
have conceptual contents. A number of philosophers have argued that our perceptual experiences 
are unlike our thoughts and beliefs in that they are mental states that represent the world in a non-
conceptual way, and thus have non-conceptual contents.8 A mental state M has nonconceptual content if 
                                                
8 See Bernueacute, 2015 for an overview of the debate about nonconceptual mental content.  
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and only if (i) M has accuracy conditions and (ii) subjects’ of M need not possess or be disposed to 
apply the concepts that would be used in a canonical specification of M’s accuracy conditions. 
One motivation these philosophers have given for claiming that perceptual experiences have non-
conceptual content appeals to the so-called “richness” of perceptual experiences. Here’s Michael Tye 
on the richness of color experiences.  
Human sensory experience is enormously rich. Take color experience. There is a 
plenitude of detail here that goes far beyond our concepts. Humans can experience 
an enormous number of subtly different colors, something on the order of 10 
million, according to some estimates. But we have names for only a few of these 
colors, and we also have no stored representations in memory for most colors.… 
This is why I cannot go into a paint store and reliably identify a color on a chart as 
exactly matching the precise hue of my dining room walls. I possess the concept red, 
of course, and I exercise it when I recognize something as red, but I lack the 
concepts for determinate hues. (Tye, 2000:11) 
 
Tye’s point is just that our perceptual experiences of color far outstrip our color concepts—we have 
highly determinate color experiences (e.g. of red17) even though we lack highly determinate color 
concepts (e.g. the concept RED17). But if our perceptual experiences of color outstrip our color 
concepts (i.e. our color experiences are more determinate than our color concepts), we obviously 
don’t need to possess and deploy color concepts for our perceptual experiences to represent those 
colors. And thus, our perceptual experiences of color must have non-conceptual contents. 
Philosophers have also motivated the view that our perceptual experiences have 
nonconceptual contents by appealing to apparent similarities between our perceptual systems and 
experiences, and the perceptual systems and experiences of babies and some non-human animals 
(Peacocke, 2001). We know by direct comparison that babies and some non-human animals have 
perceptual systems that are substantially similar to our own. And we have a fair amount of evidence 
that they also have perceptual experiences that are similar (at least in certain respects) to our own. 
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However, it’s plausible that babies and non-human animals don’t possess all the concepts that would 
be needed to specify the contents of those perceptual experiences.  So, the possession of concepts 
and disposition to apply them must not be necessary for having perceptual experiences. Since high-
level representations are perceptual experiences representing high-level properties, the motivations 
for thinking that perceptual experiences have non-conceptual contents are also motivations for 
thinking that high-level representations have (or would have) conceptual contents. 
Reply. The motivations philosophers have given for thinking that our perceptual experiences 
have non-conceptual contents don’t apply to perceptual experiences representing high-level 
properties. Take the motivation stemming from the apparent richness of our perceptual experiences. 
We seem to perceptually experience far more colors and shapes, for example, then we have color 
and shape concepts. This suggests that we don’t need to possess and apply color and shape concepts 
in order to have perceptual experiences of color and shape properties. But richness considerations 
don’t seem to apply when it comes to perceptual experiences representing high-level properties. We 
don’t seem to perceptually experience more high-level properties then we have high-level property 
concepts. 
The motivation arising from empirical evidence concerning the perceptual systems and 
experiences of babies and nonhuman animals also doesn’t seem to apply when it comes to 
perceptual experiences of high-level properties. We don’t have empirical evidence concerning the 
perceptual representation of high-level properties. Any evidence we have comes from the contrast 
cases and the associated phenomenal contrast arguments.9 
Second Objection. Premise (6) of your argument is false. It assumes if the subjects need to have 
and/or be in certain cognitive states in order to perceptually represent high-level properties, (i.e. 
                                                
9 Some people contend there is empirical evidence that babies perceptually represent facial properties. But for reasons I 
will discuss in section 4.4, I don't consider this a counterexample to my claim. 
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having and/or being in certain cognitive states is necessary for the perceptual representation of high-
level properties), then those cognitive states must be directly influencing their perceptual experiences 
of high-level properties. But even if having and/or being in certain cognitive states is necessary for 
the perceptual representation of high-level properties, you can’t conclude that those cognitive states 
are influencing subjects’ perceptual experiences of high-level properties. It’s not generally true that if 
A is necessary for B, that A influences B (directly or otherwise). To see that, just consider that being 
at least 6 feet tall is necessary for being 7 feet tall. But it’s clearly not the case that being at least 6 feet 
tall influences being 7 feet tall. 
Reply. I grant in general, that you can’t conclude from A’s being necessary for B, that A 
influences B. However, I think the conclusion is warranted here. Statements of the form “A is 
necessary for B” do not express primitive facts – i.e. if “A is necessary for B” is true, it’s true 
because or in virtue of the fact that there is some underlying relationship between A and B. Being at 
least 6 feet tall is necessary for being 7 feet tall because in being 7 feet tall, one is by definition, also 
at least 6 feet tall. What, then, is the underlying relationship between having and/or being in certain 
cognitive states and perceptual experiences representing high-level properties? It’s certainly not a 
matter of definition. My contention is that subjects need to have and/or be in certain cognitive 
states in order to perceptually represent high-level properties because the perceptual representation 
of high-level properties requires or involves influence from cognition. 
1.4.3 Argument from Explanation 
High-levelists have concluded that the best (and perhaps only) explanation for certain perceptual 
experiences being different (e.g. subjects’ perceptual experiences in the contrast cases) is that those 
experiences represent different high-level properties. But even if we grant that the perceptual 
experiences in question are different (and, in many cases, that’s up for debate), I take it the 
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conclusion that those perceptual experiences are different because they represent different high-level 
properties can only be sustained if there’s a plausible account of how perceptual experiences come 
to represent (different) high-level properties. 
Up to this point, high-levelists have said remarkably little about how high-level properties 
come to be represented in our perceptual experiences. They have described a variety of cases in 
which it supposedly happens, but they have said little about how it supposedly happens. Some high-
levelists have suggested an account in terms of cognitive penetration. I take it their basic proposal is 
that high-level properties come to be represented in our perceptual experiences as a result of our 
cognitive states directly influencing or altering the contents of our perceptual experiences. 
Even though some high-levelists have suggested that our perceptual experiences come to 
represent high-level properties via cognitive penetration, the general consensus seems to be that 
high-levelists aren’t committed to cognitive penetration, and that there can be high-level 
representations without cognitive penetration. However, I take it, that assumes there’s a plausible 
account of how our perceptual experiences come to represent high-level properties not in terms of 
cognitive penetration. My goal in this section is to argue there is no such theory in the offing. 
Broadly speaking, there are only two types of accounts high-levelists could give: internalist or 
externalist. Internalists about perceptual representation (i.e. the contents of our perceptual 
experiences) contend that what our perceptual experiences represent is entirely determined by (or 
supervenes on) our internal states or intrinsic features. And that means, for internalists, whether and 
what (high-level) properties our perceptual experiences represent is entirely determined by our 
internal states. And that also means, for internalists, there can’t be differences in what properties our 
perceptual experiences represent, unless there are also differences in our internal states or intrinsic 
features. 
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So, an internalist account of how subjects’ perceptual experiences come to represent 
(different) high-level properties in the contrast cases would have to explain (differences in) high-
level representations purely in terms of (differences in) subjects’ internal states. As far as I can see, 
there are only three possible types of internal states such an account could appeal to: innate features 
of subjects’ perceptual systems, noncognitive inputs to subjects’ perceptual systems, and cognitive 
inputs to subjects’ perceptual systems. However, the account can’t appeal to cognitive inputs to 
subjects’ perceptual systems without also appealing to cognitive penetration. So, for there to be an 
internalist account of high-level representations not in terms of cognitive penetration, it would have 
to be just in terms of innate features of subjects’ perceptual systems and/or noncognitive inputs to 
their perceptual systems. 
So the question is whether there is a plausible account just in terms of innate features of and 
non-cognitive input to subjects’ perceptual system(s) that could explain their perceptual experiences 
representing different high-level properties in the contrast cases. I don’t think so. The account needs 
to explain how subjects’ perceptual experiences could have represented different high-level 
properties in the contrast cases. For example, it would have to explain how your visual experience 
could have failed to represent the property of being a pine tree before you learned to recognize pine 
trees, but then came to represent it after you had learned. However, as I mentioned, an internalist 
account can’t explain subjects’ perceptual experiences representing different properties, high-level or 
otherwise, without appealing to some sort of difference(s) in subjects’ internal states. And subjects in 
the contrast cases don’t seem to differ with respect to either the innate features of or noncognitive 
inputs to their perceptual systems. But the contrast cases, by design, are pairs of cases that are nearly 
identical – only differing from one another with respect to some aspect(s) of subjects’ cognition. 
When it comes to Siegel’s contrast cases, for example, we are supposed to be imagining that the 
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cases are identical apart from the fact that you have the ability to recognize pine trees in one case, 
but not the other. 
But if the only differences between the contrast cases is with respect to aspect(s) of subjects’ 
cognition, then there are no differences in the innate features of or noncognitive inputs to their 
perceptual systems to which that an internalist account could appeal to explain subjects’ perceptual 
experiences representing different high-level properties in those cases (e.g. your perceptual systems 
have the same innate features before and after you learned to recognize pine trees, and if, in fact, the 
difference(s) in your recognitional ability is the only difference between the cases there is, then the 
noncognitive inputs to your perceptual systems are also the same before and after you learned to 
recognize pine trees). To put it differently, since subjects in the contrast cases are the same with 
respect to the innate features of and noncognitive inputs to their perceptual systems, it’s not possible 
for there to be an account just in terms of innate features and noncognitive inputs that would be 
capable of explaining subjects’ perceptual experiences representing different high-level properties. 
But suppose we were to allow that the contrast cases differ from one another with respect to 
more than just some aspect(s) of subjects’ cognition – suppose we were to allow that the contrast 
cases differ with respect to both innate features of and noncognitive inputs to subjects’ perceptual 
systems. You might wonder whether there could be an internalist account under those conditions. 
The question then is whether differences in innate features of and /or noncognitive inputs to 
subjects’ perceptual systems could plausibly explain how their perceptual experiences came to 
represent different high-level properties. Once again, I think the answer is no. 
We have innate abilities to perceptually represent properties like shapes, colors, tones, and 
textures. That is to say that the innate features of our perceptual systems are such that they can 
process information coming in through our sense organs and produce perceptual experiences 
representing those properties. Consider, for example, visual representations of color properties. We 
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don’t have to learn anything, know anything, or do anything for color properties to be represented 
in our visual experiences. If our eyes are open and the lights are on we can’t help but have visual 
experiences that represent color properties – even if we would prefer not to. 
However, we don’t have any innate abilities to perceptually represent high-level properties 
(even high-levelists agree with that). In all the cases purportedly involving high-level representations, 
subjects had to learn, know, and/or do something for their perceptual experiences to come to 
represent high-level properties. But if we have to learn it, know, or do something for our perceptual 
experiences to represent high-level properties, that suggests there can’t be an explanation of 
differences in high-level representations in terms of innate features of subjects’ perceptual systems, 
even if those innate features were different.  
Could there be an explanation for subjects’ perceptual experiences representing different 
high-level properties in terms of different noncognitive inputs into their perceptual systems? I take it 
that noncognitive inputs could only be three things: sensory inputs from the environment to the 
relevant perceptual system (e.g. for visual experiences, sensory inputs to the visual system), sensory 
inputs to the relevant perceptual system from other perceptual systems (e.g. auditory inputs to the 
visual system), or non-sensory (and noncognitive) inputs from any of the perceptual systems. So, the 
question is whether differences in any of those kinds of inputs could plausibly explain how subjects’ 
perceptual experiences came to represent different high-level properties. 
For differences in any of those kinds of inputs to explain subjects’ perceptual experiences 
coming to represent different high-level properties, it would have to be possible for those kinds of 
inputs to explain high-level representations. However, I don’t see how that would be possible. 
Consider your visual experience representing the property of being a pine tree. According to Siegel 
(2010) your visual experience came to represent that property as a result of your learning to 
recognize pine trees by sight, together with cognitive penetration. But could you have come to 
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represent the property of being a pine tree as a result of noncognitive inputs to your visual system? I 
don’t see how. It’s not as though your visual experience coming to represent that property is like 
your visual experience coming to represent a new color. Changes in sensory inputs to your visual 
system could certainly explain your visual experience coming to represent a new color (as well as 
other low-level properties). But how could changing (or adding) sensory inputs to your visual system 
explain your visual experience coming to represent the property of being a pine tree? Presumably, 
having the property of being a pine tree is to possess a certain kind of essence and/or a certain kind 
of history. But presumably, there is no sensory information about essences or histories. Those are 
not features that are perceptual systems have evolved to detect. In other words, our perceptual 
systems do not have the ability to detect something’s essence or history. So I take it that no change 
to or additional sensory inputs could possibly explain your visual experience coming to represent the 
property of being a pine tree after you had learned to recognize pine trees. 
Plausibly, our perceptual experiences can represent colors (and other low-level properties) 
even if we don’t possess the relevant color concepts, because our perceptual systems evolved to 
detect such properties. And thus our perceptual systems can produce experiences that represent 
color properties with just inputs/information coming in from our sensory organs.  
But presumably our perceptual systems did not evolve to detect the property of being a pine 
tree (or other high-level properties). According to Siegel, you come to perceptually represent that 
property (via cognitive penetration) because of learning how to recognize pine trees. But how could 
learning to recognize pine trees, which I take it is a cognitive matter, plausibly give you the ability to 
visually represent a new property, namely the property of being a pine tree?  
Plausibly, in learning to recognize pine trees, you gained the concept PINE TREE and/or 
the disposition to apply your concept PINE TREE when undergoing a visual experience of a pine 
tree. But suppose you can’t recognize pine trees and that you even lack the concept PINE TREE. It 
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doesn’t seem like there’s any way your perceptual system(s) just using information from your sensory 
organs, could produce a perceptual experience representing the property of being a pine tree. It’s 
plausible that possessing high-level property concepts and being disposed to apply those concepts to 
your perceptual experiences are necessary for your perceptual experiences to come to represent 
high-level properties because your perceptual systems can’t generate representations of high-level 
properties just using sensory information (poverty of the stimulus). However, if you possess high-
level property concepts and abilities to apply those concepts to your perceptual experiences, then 
your  perceptual systems can make use of that information to make up the difference (e.g. perhaps 
your perceptual systems can use those concepts, along with whatever comes along with your abilities 
to apply those concepts, to group or chunk sensory inputs in a way that makes it possible for your 
perceptual systems to generate experiences that represent high-level properties). The idea is that 
your perceptual system(s) take in sensory inputs/information, which allows them to generate 
representations of low-level properties, and then your perceptual system(s) use those representations 
together with your concept PINE TREE, to generate a perceptual experience that represents the 
property of being a pine tree. 
Since subjects’ cognitive states are internal states, there could be an internalist account 
appealing to cognitive penetration that plausibly explains high-level representations. But I conclude 
there is no internalist account that plausibly explains high-level representation without appealing to 
cognitive penetration. 
Is there an externalist account of high-level representation that could plausibly explain 
subjects’ perceptual experiences representing different high-level properties in the contrast cases? 
Externalists about perceptual representation contend that what our perceptual experiences represent 
is partly determined by (or minimally supervenes partly on) factors external to subjects of those 
experiences. The most popular externalist account of perceptual representation is tracking 
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representationalism or tracking intentionalism.10 There are a few different versions of this view, but the 
basic thesis is that our perceptual experiences represent those features or properties (of our 
environments) that our perceptual states normally track (or track under normal conditions). So the 
question is whether there is a plausible account of high-level representations in terms of what our 
perceptual states normally track that can plausibly explain how subjects’ perceptual experiences came 
to represent different high-level properties in the contrast cases. 
The primary source of disagreement among proponents of the tracking account is over what 
“normally tracks” or “tracks under normal conditions” means. One of the main competing views, 
most associated with the work of Fred Dretske, cashes out the meaning of “normally tracks” in 
teleological terms (Dretske, 1995). On this view, the features or properties that our perceptual states 
normally track are understood to be the ones that our perceptual states evolved or were designed by 
nature to track. And since our perceptual experiences only represent those features or properties our 
perceptual states normally track, according to this view, our perceptual experiences only represent 
those properties our perceptual states evolved or were designed to track. 
Teleological interpretations of the tracking account, however, have been criticized for 
(among other things) having the consequence that Swampman – an accidentally created micro-
physical duplicate of a human being – has no perceptual experiences. Since Swampman was created 
by accident, his perceptual states did  not evolve and were not designed by nature to track anything. 
And thus, on this interpretation, Swampman’s perceptual states don’t track anything, and thus he 
doesn’t have any perceptual experiences at all! 
Even if we set aside worries about the teleological version of the tracking account, it is 
implausible high-levelists can explain subjects coming to perceptually represent high-level properties 
                                                
10 For an overview and discussion of the key versions of the tracking views see Bourget and Mendelovici, 
2014.  
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(in the contrast cases). On teleological tracking account, our perceptual experiences represent those 
properties that our perceptual states evolved or were designed by nature to track. So for there to be 
a teleological tracking account of high-level representations, it would have to be the case that our 
perceptual states evolved to track high-level properties. But no one—not even high-leveliststhinks 
that our perceptual states evolved to track high-level properties. Plausibly, the properties our 
perceptual states were evolved to track are identical to the properties that we have innate abilities to 
perceptually represent—and those are low-level properties, like colors and shapes.11 And if our 
perceptual states did not evolve to track high-level properties, there can't be a teleological tracking 
account of high-level representations. 
An alternative to the teleological view, most associated with the work of Michael Tye, cashes 
out “normally tracks” in counterfactual terms. On Tye’s view, our perceptual experiences represent 
those features or properties they would track under optimal conditions, where optimal conditions 
are those conditions under which an experience representing property P would be tokened in 
subjects if and only if P were the case, and because of P (Tye, 2000). 
So the question is whether there is an optimal conditions version of the tracking theory that 
could plausibly explain subjects’ perceptual experiences coming to represent high-level properties (in 
the contract cases). At least on the face of it, this seems more promising than that teleological 
version. After all, high-levelists claim that subjects come to perceptually represent high-level 
properties as a result of learning to recognize them by sight. So, for example, your perceptual 
experiences purportedly come to represent the property of being a pine tree after you've learned to 
recognize pine trees by sight. But presumably having the ability to recognize pine trees by sight 
means that you can reliably identify pine trees when they are around, and that you don't (often) mis-
                                                
11 With the possible exception of facial and linguistic properties. But it's unclear those should count as high-
level properties. See section 4.4. 
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identify non-pine trees (e.g. "recognize" birch trees as pine trees). But if that's the case, your 
perceptual experiences will represent the property of being a pine tree when you are in the presence 
of pine trees and because of pine trees. And that sounds awfully lot like the optimal conditions 
requirement. 
The problem is that presumably your perceptual experiences won't just represent the 
property of being a pine tree in the presence of (and because of) pine trees. But also in the presence 
of (and because of) twin pine trees and other pine tree look-alikes. In other words, your perceptual 
representation of the property of being a pine tree fails to meet the "only if" side of the requirement. 
So I conclude that it's also implausible there is an optimal conditions tracking account of high-level 
representations. 
Since tracking theories are not the only externalist theories of representation, I haven't 
shown definitively that there can't be a plausible externalists account of high-level representations. 
However, I think I've done enough to shift the burden of proof onto high-levelists — if there is a 
plausible account (not in terms of cognitive penetration) for high-level representations, then what is 
it? 
1.1.2 Objections and Replies 
First objection. Premise (4) of your argument is false. There is substantial empirical evidence that we 
have innate abilities to perceptually represent some high-level properties – namely, facial and 
linguistic properties. So there could be a plausible explanation for subjects’ perceptual experiences 
representing different high-level properties in terms of differences in the innate features of their 
perceptual systems. 
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Reply. I accept that there is substantial empirical evidence that we have innate abilities to perceptually 
represent facial and linguistic properties. However, for this objection to work, we also have to accept 
that facial in linguistic properties are high-level. And I’m not prepared to do that.  
If we assume that “high-level properties” and “low-level properties” name categories that are 
both mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive, then facial and linguistic properties have to be 
one or the other. People engaged in debate over high-level representation have tended to assume 
they are high-level. But I see no reason to accept that. 
Whether facial and linguistic properties are high-level or low-level depends on how those 
categories are defined. Unfortunately, the typical way this has been done in the literature is via lists 
of canonical or paradigmatic examples of each. Low-level properties are defined as properties like 
colors and shapes. And high-level properties are defined as properties like being a duck and being a 
pine tree.  
On the face of it, there does seem to be a difference between properties like shape and color, 
on the one hand, and properties like being a pine tree and being a mate in six, on the other. But it’s 
not at all obvious which of these two categories facial and linguistic properties fall into.  
Those definitions may be fine for some purposes. However, unless there’s a clear way to “go 
on” or continue the list, they are virtually useless when it comes to categorizing new properties or 
properties not already on one of the lists. 
Aware of the inherent flaws of “list definitions”, a couple of philosophers have attempted to 
define the categories by articulating their essential feature(s). Here is one such attempt. 
Some properties are high-level compared to quintessential low-level properties in the sense 
that the awareness of the former depends on neural processing of the latter, for instance our 
awareness of the high-level property of being a face or the property of gazing in a particular 
direction depends on the neural processing of lower-level properties, such as shape, texture, 
and direction and brightness (Brogaard & Chomanki, 2015: 473-4). 
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That way of defining the categories does give us a principled way of categorizing properties not 
already on the canonical lists. And it also has the result that facial and linguistic properties are high-
level. The problem is that this way of drawing the distinction or defining the categories can’t be 
right. 
 It seems to me that one desideratum on any definitions of low-level and high-level 
properties is that they have to correctly categorize or “get right” most or all of the properties already 
on the lists – i.e. that definitions must count as low-level those properties on the lists of 
paradigmatic low-level properties, and must count as high-level those properties on the list of  
paradigmatic high-level properties. The proposed definition is good to the extent that it achieves this 
goal, and bad to the extent that it fails. 
But Brogaard and Chomanski’s definition does poorly in this regard. Presumably, our 
perceptual awareness of color properties depends on the neural processing associated with our 
perceptual awareness of shape properties. We can’t visually represent a color without visually 
representing something (an object, an area) that is extended space, and we can’t visually represent 
things as extended in space without representing shapes. So it seems to follow on Brogaard and 
Chomanski’s definitions that color and shape properties are high-level! But that’s unacceptable. 
Color and shape properties are the paradigmatic low-level properties. 
 And just in case you’re the least bit tempted to accept that shape and color properties are 
high-level, I want to emphasize that the problem here is not just that that definition fails to respect 
the canonical lists. If shape and color properties are categorized as high-level, since everyone already 
agrees that our perceptual experiences represent color and shape properties, this way of defining the 
properties has the consequence that the question of whether our perceptual experiences represent 
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high-level properties is no longer interesting. However, it leaves unanswered the question as to 
whether our perceptual experiences represent properties like being a duck and being a pine tree. 12,13 
So where does that leave us? As I said, for the high-levelist’s objection to premise (4) to 
work, facial and linguistic properties would have to be high-level. But I've argued whether facial and 
linguistic properties are high-level depends on how “high-level properties” is defined. And I've 
argued none of the proposed definitions for “higher-level properties” are both plausible and support 
the claim that facial in linguistic properties are high-level. 
I am satisfied with the above reply, but just for good measure, I also want to offer a reply to 
the objection that doesn't rely on quibbling over the definition of “high-level properties”. My second 
reply is that even if we grant that facial and linguistic properties are high-level (and that we have 
innate abilities to perceptually represent those properties), at most, that shows my argument needs to 
be restricted to perceptual representations of non-linguistic and non-facial high-level properties.  
                                                
12  You might be wondering whether Brogaard and Chomanski’s definitions can be rescued with a 
minor tweak – namely changing ‘dependence’ to ‘asymmetric dependence’. High-level properties would then 
be defined as properties, our perceptual awareness of which asymmetrically depends on the neural processing 
of low-level properties. On this definition, the properties of being a duck and being a pine tree would come 
out as high-level since, presumably, our perceptual awareness of those properties depends on the neural 
processing of color and shape properties. But presumably our perceptual awareness of color and shape 
properties does not depend on the neural processing of the property of being a duck or being a pine tree. But 
the advantage of this definition is that it gets shape and color properties right because the dependencies 
between color and shape properties are symmetric. 
Even though the definition in terms of asymmetric dependence gets color and shape properties right 
– namely, as low-level properties, it seems to get other canonical low-level properties, like motion and depth 
properties, wrong – according to this definition, motion and depth properties are high-level. Presumably, we 
can’t be perceptually aware of motion or depth properties without being perceptually aware of something in 
motion or at a distance. And presumably we can’t be perceptually aware of something in motion or at a 
distance without being perceptually aware of color and shape properties. If that’s right, then presumably our 
perceptual awareness of motion and depth properties asymmetrically depends on the neural processing of 
color and shape properties. 
13 A proposal I find compelling draws the distinction between low-level and high-level properties in terms of 
innateness. To put it differently, the proposal I prefer uses innateness as the dividing line between low-level 
and high-level properties. The low-level properties are the properties that our perceptual experiences 
represents as a result of innate features alone. The high-level properties, in contrast, are the properties that 
our perceptual experiences represent, but not as a result of innate features alone. But I take it high-levelists 
won't be happy with this way of drawing the distinction because it puts causal, linguistic, and facial properties 
on the low-level side. 
 33 
Much of the debate over high-level representations has centered on perceptual 
representations of natural and artifactual kind properties (e.g.  being a duck, being a pine tree, and 
being a stethoscope). And everyone (including high-levelists) agrees that we don’t have innate 
abilities to perceptually represent properties like that. If our perceptual experiences come to 
represent those properties, it’s as a result of subjects learning something, coming to know 
something, and/or doing something. And my claim is that we can't gain abilities to perceptually 
represent high-level properties (i.e. properties we don’t have innate abilities to perceptually 
represent) without cognitive penetration.  
1.5 CONCLUSION 
Two of the most popular debates in the philosophy of perception in recent years have been over 
whether high-level properties are represented in our perceptual experiences (i.e. the existence of 
high-level representations), and whether our cognitive states can directly influence or alter our 
perceptual experiences (i.e. the existence of cognitive penetration). Despite some overlap between 
these debates (e.g. when high-levelists have appealed to cognitive penetration as an explanation for 
subjects’ perceptual experiences coming to represent high-level properties), the general sense has 
been that these issues are entirely independent – i.e. that there can be high-level representations 
without that cognitive penetration, and cognitive penetration without high-level representation.  
I don't deny that there can be cognitive penetration without high-level representations. In 
fact, the alleged empirical evidence of cognitive penetration that people have found most compelling 
comes from experiments purportedly finding that subjects’ perceptual representations of low-level 
properties had been directly influenced or altered by their cognitive states. For example, experiments 
purportedly found that children’s needs and desires had directly influenced or altered their visual 
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experiences of pennies, dimes, nickels, quarters, and half dollars—made them look about 30% 
bigger (in diameter) than they actually were.  
However, my aim in this essay has been to argue that the existence of (some) high-level 
representations depends on the existence of cognitive penetration. If my arguments are successful, 
they show that the existence of cognitive penetration is necessary for the existence of (some) high-
level representations. 
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Chapter 2: Evidence of Perceptual Adaptation is not Evidence of 
Cognitive Penetration 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Over the last several years, a number of philosophers and psychologists have endorsed the 
thesis that there’s cognitive penetration, i.e. the thesis that our cognitive states can (and sometimes do) 
directly influence or alter our perceptual experiences (i.e. the way things look, sound, smell, taste, 
and feel to us). Even though no one thinks that it’s impossible14, the thesis that there is cognitive 
penetration (i.e. that it actually exists) is both radical and controversial.  
There are several reasons for that. Among them is the fact that the existence of cognitive 
penetration is inconsistent with our best theories about how human perception works (Marr, 1982). 
It also conflicts with assumptions built into current computer models of perception (in particular 
vision) according to which cognition plays no role (i.e. don’t include cognitive variables) (Firestone 
and Scholl, 2016). The existence of cognitive penetration also doesn’t square with the fact that we 
continue to experience optical illusions (e.g. the Phi effect, the Müller-Lyer lines, and the Ames 
room) long after we’ve learned both that the illusions are not as they appear, and how they really are 
(e.g. that the Müller-Lyer lines are really the same length) (Fodor, 1984). It also seems opposed to 
the fact that we can’t change our perceptual experiences simply by changing our minds.  We can 
change our minds, so if there’s cognitive penetration and our minds can change our perceptual 
experiences, then why can’t we change our perceptual experiences simply by changing our minds?  
                                                
14 No one denies there could have been cognitive penetration. It seems both metaphysically and nomically 
possible. What people have argued is that the existence of cognitive penetration is inconsistent with our 
actual mental architecture. But, presumably, our mental architecture could have been different than it actually 
is.  
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Proponents of cognitive penetration don’t really deny that there are reasons—perhaps even 
very good reasons—to doubt there is cognitive penetration. They just think those reasons are 
outweighed by what they take to be compelling empirical evidence of its existence. Given that 
empirical evidence of cognitive penetration is the only reason we have to believe it exists, and we 
have lots of reasons to believe it doesn't, we need to be asking two questions: just how compelling is 
empirical evidence of cognitive penetration and is it compelling enough to override all the reasons 
we have to doubt? Ultimately, here's where I come down on those two questions: not very and 
definitely not. 
 Most of the empirical evidence that proponents of cognitive penetration have presented in 
defense of their view is from studies reportedly finding top-down effects on subjects’ perceptual 
experiences, i.e. effects on their perceptual experiences that were a result of direct influence from 
their cognitive state(s). Among these are a study that reportedly found “valuable” coins looked 
bigger to children than worthless cardboard discs of the same size as a result of influence from their 
desires (Bruner and Goodman, 1947), a study that reportedly found that heart-shaped cutout looked 
redder to subjects than oval-shaped cutouts of the same color as a result of direct influence from 
their color expectations (discussed in McPherson, 2012), and a study that reportedly found that 
African-American faces looked darker to subjects than Caucasian faces with the same average 
luminance as a result of direct influence from subjects’ racial stereotypes (Levin and Banaji, 2006).15  
                                                
15 It's worth noting that these reported "findings" were not the observations or data collected from the 
studies. The observations for data from these studies concern subjects behaviors and self reported judgments 
– e.g. subjects’ judgments of the size of coins were larger than their judgments of the worthless cardboard 
discs. Researchers then inferred from subjects behaviors and/or judgments, that they must have had different 
perceptual experiences. But because of the similarities in the experimental settings, researchers inferred that 
the (alleged) differences in subjects’ perceptual experiences must have been a result of differences in their 
cognitive states.  
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There’s no question that the top-down effects reportedly found in these studies would be 
cases of cognitive penetration (i.e. they meet all four of the conditions I discussed in the last 
section). So if it could be established that those top-down effects were actually found, that wouldn't 
just be compelling evidence of cognitive penetration, that would be proof! So I take it the reason 
these studies are presented as evidence of cognitive penetration, and not proof of it, reflects 
uncertainty with respect to whether their reported findings hold up—i.e. whether top-down effects 
were actually found.  
And opponent of cognitive penetration have effectively argued this empirical evidence is 
unconvincing precisely because it's implausible that top-down effects were actually found (e.g. Bitter, 
2014; for a comprehensive treatment see, Firestone and Scholl, 2016; Gross et al, 2014; O’Callaghan, 
2010; Zeimbekis, 2013). Broadly speaking, they have challenged these reported findings in two ways: 
either by denying there really was the reported difference in subjects’ perceptual experience (e.g. that 
coins looked bigger than worthless cardboard disks of the same size), or by denying the reported 
differences in subjects’ perceptual experience were a result of direct influence from their cognitive 
state(s) (e.g. direct influence from children’s’ desires for objects of social value). 
 But some of the empirical evidence they discuss is from studies that have reportedly found, 
what I’ll call, adaptational effects on subjects’ perceptual experiences, i.e. effects on their perceptual 
experiences that arose after (or perhaps over) an extended period of time and were a result of 
durable changes in the way perceptual systems process information (e.g. sensory inputs) or, what we 
might call, processing adaptations. Proponents of cognitive penetration have also claimed compelling 
empirical evidence of cognitive penetration has come from studies that have reportedly found 
adaptational effects on subjects perceptual experiences. Among these are a study that reportedly 
found that after subjects had worn a pair of inverting glasses (continuously) for almost two weeks, 
the upside-down-look of everything (which the glasses had initially induced) had faded away—i.e. 
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everything looked right-side-up again (Churchland, 1988), a study that reportedly found that subjects 
made faster and better visual discriminations among a set of target stimuli after numerous intensive 
training sessions on those stimuli (Cecchi, 2014), and a study that reportedly found that the subjects 
in the study from non-Western cultures were less susceptible to certain visual illusions (e.g. the 
Müller-Lyer lines) than the subjects in the study from Western cultures (McCauley and Henrich, 
2006).  
 Unlike the empirical evidence coming from studies reportedly finding top-down effects, the 
empirical evidence coming from studies reportedly finding adaptational effects has largely flown 
under the radar and escaped careful scrutiny. In what follows, I will argue the empirical evidence 
coming from studies adaptational effects is even less compelling than the empirical support coming 
from studies that have reportedly found top down effects.  
The remainder of this essay will proceed as follows. In section 2, I will say more about 
cognitive penetration. In section 3, I will discuss the empirical evidence from studies reportedly 
finding adaptational effects, in particular the inversion lenses experiment. Even if we assume that 
those reported findings hold up (i.e. adaptational effects were found in those studies), that’s only 
empirical evidence of cognitive penetration if adaptational effects are cases of cognitive penetration. 
But in section 4, I argue that’s completely implausible. In section 5, I consider the possibility that 
adaptational effects are cases of weak cognitive penetration. In section 6, I show how my reasoning 
applies to two further empirical studies reportedly finding adaptational effects. I finish with a few 
concluding remarks (Section 7). 
2.2 COGNITIVE PENETRATION 
Is there cognitive penetration? To answer that question we first need to know what cognitive 
penetration is. We know that it’s a kind of cognitive influence on perception, or from the other side, 
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a kind of effect in perception resulting from cognitive influence. But there is a lot of disagreement 
over how to define the phenomenon more precisely (Stokes, 2015; Wu, 2013; Macpherson, 2012)—
and, unfortunately, the result of that has been that there are about as many different definitions of 
cognitive penetration as there are people engaged in the debate over its existence.  
But the significance of the disagreement over how to define cognitive penetration should not be 
overblown. Everyone knows that definitions are hard. But as Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart 
once said regarding hard-core pornography, and I’m paraphrasing, “I may not be able to define it, 
but I know it when I see it.” And despite the disagreement over the definition, there has, in fact, 
been a fair amount of agreement between people’s judgments about whether particular effects on 
perceptual experience would count as cases of cognitive penetration. So instead of trying to define 
the phenomenon, I will try to articulate the central or core features of cases of cognitive penetration. 
I take it that, at a minimum, cases of cognitive penetration are (or would be) effects on 
perceptual experiences that are, in some sense, a result of influence from cognition, where an effect 
on perceptual experience is an aspect (or content) of a perceptual experience that has been changed, 
altered, or is different than it otherwise would be (i.e. if there had been no influence from cognition).  
But there are all sorts of effects on our perceptual experiences that are, in some sense, a result of 
influence from cognition, but are definitely not cases of cognitive penetration. For example, suppose 
I cup my hand behind my ear because I want to hear you better and believe that cupping my hand 
behind my ear will enable me to hear you better. And suppose it does, in fact, alter (or enhance) my 
auditory experience. In that situation, the change in my auditory experience was, in some sense, the 
result of influence from my cognitive states — namely my desire to hear you better and my belief 
about how to accomplish that. But no one thinks that effect on my auditory experience would count 
as a case of cognitive penetration. 
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There is some disagreement among people as to why it wouldn't count. But the reason has 
something to do with the indirect or mediated nature of the influence from my cognitive states. My 
cognitive states only contributed to the change in my auditory experience by bringing about a change 
in a non-cognitive dimension of the situation – namely, the position of my hand behind my ear. But 
it was that change in the non-cognitive dimension of the situation that was directly or immediately 
responsible for the change in my auditory experience. To put it differently, it wasn't my cognitive 
states per se that did the relevant work in bringing about the affect on my auditory experience. The 
relevant work was done by the change in the position of by hand. My cognitive states were neither 
necessary nor sufficient for the effect on my auditory experience. If a muscle spasm, and not my 
belief and desire, had caused my hand to cup behind my ear there still would've been a change in my 
auditory experience. But if my hands had been restrained, my belief and desire wouldn’t have 
changed anything.  
The upshot is that to be a case of cognitive penetration, effects on perceptual experiences have 
to be a result of direct or unmediated influence(s) from cognition. I’ll call this the directness requirement.  
It also generally thought that to be cases of cognitive penetration, the resulting effects on perceptual 
experiences have to “make sense” given the cognitive state(s) that did the influencing—i.e. be 
semantically or logically related to the cognitive states doing the influencing. Here is how Zeon 
Pylyshyn states, what I’ll call, the semantic constraint.  
…if a system is cognitively penetrable then the function it computes is sensitive, in a 
semantically coherent way, to the organism’s goals and beliefs, that is, it can be altered in a 
way that bears some logical relation to what the person knows. (Pylyshyn, 1999: 343) 
 
The semantic constraint ensures there's an intelligible connection between the resulting effects on 
perceptual experiences and the cognitive states doing the influencing. Fiona MacPherson helpfully 
illustrates the point with the following example. 
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I believe that today is the day of an important exam. This belief causes stress and brings on a 
migraine. The migraine causes disturbances to my vision and I now experience flashing lights 
at the periphery of my visual field in addition to experiencing the scene in front of me. In this 
case, my visual experience has been altered on account of my belief but there is no intelligible 
connection between the content of the belief – my exam is today – and the content of my 
visual experience – the apparent flashing lights…(MacPherson, 2012: 26) 
  
No one thinks that the flashing lights in this scenario would count as a case of cognitive 
penetration. Now, arguably, that's because the flashing lights also failed to meet the direct this 
requirement — the influence from cognition is mediated by the migraine. However, presumably 
even if we were to relax the directness requirement – and allow (some) effects on perceptual 
experience resulting from indirect cognitive influence to count as cases of cognitive penetration — 
the flashing lights still wouldn't count as a case of cognitive penetration. And we need the semantic 
constraint to get that result. 
 At this point we’ve covered what are widely considered to the core features of cases of cognitive 
penetration. And taken together they tell us that a case of cognitive penetration would have to meet 
the following four conditions: 
(i) be an effect on a perceptual experience; 
(ii) that was the result of cognitive influence(s); 
(iii) where the cognitive influence(s) is direct or unmediated (e.g. by changes in the stimuli, sensory 
organs, or attention); 
(iv) and where the effect is semantically or logically related to (the content of) the cognitive state(s) 
doing the influencing16.  
 
The claim that there’s cognitive penetration, then, can be understood as the claim that there are actual 
cases of cognitive penetration. 
                                                
16 Adapted from (Bitter, 2014:4) 
 44 
2.3 THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF ADAPTATIONAL EFFECTS 
Most of the empirical evidence of cognitive penetration comes from studies reportedly 
finding top-down effects. There’s no question that top-down effects would be cases of cognitive 
penetration.17  So finding top-down effects wouldn’t just be empirical evidence that there’s cognitive 
penetration, it would be proof. But the problem with empirical studies reportedly finding top-down 
effects is that their reported findings don't hold up. 
But proponents of cognitive penetration have also claimed empirical evidence comes from 
studies reportedly finding adaptational effects on subjects’ perceptual experiences, i.e. effects on 
perceptual experiences that are a result of changes in the way perceptual systems process 
information. One of these studies that proponents of cognitive penetration have found particularly 
compelling is what I’ll call the inverting lenses experiment. Here’s Paul Churchland’s discussion of the 
study.18  
 
 Recall the effects of chronically worn 'inverting lens' on the visual perception of 
normal humans. Such lenses have the effect of inverting the orientation of all visual 
information relative to the body's tactile and motor systems. In short, they turn the 
visual world upside down… 
 The initial effect [of wearing the lenses] is profoundly disorienting, but with little 
more than a week's practice, subjects adjust to the new perceptual regime. The 
subjects are not confined to a chair or bed for the duration of the experiment, but 
are forced by practical necessity to continue to interact with familiar objects and to 
engage in the normal forms of motor behavior. The result is that the subjects slowly 
manage to recoordinate their vision with the rest of their sensory and motor systems, 
and the illusion of the world's being upside down is said to fade away, all on a time 
scale of roughly a week… 
 In similar experiments on animals, training produces a reversal in the character 
of what one might have presumed to be endogenously specified reflexes, such as the 
vestibular-ocular reflex, which directs one's eyes, when fixated on a target, to move 
                                                
17 The fact that top-down effects are clear cases of cognitive penetration is no surprise. The studies reportedly 
finding top-down effects were set to look for cognitive penetration. 
18 Dustin Stokes (XXX) and Robert McCauley & Joseph Henrich (XXX) also mention this study in arguing 
for cognitive penetration. 
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an appropriate amount or right in order to compensate for head movements in the 
opposite direction. Here the brain seems literally to rewire the relevant neural 
mechanism under the pressures imposed by left-right inverting lenses (Gonshor and 
Jones 1976). 
 Cases like these are important, for they reflect the plasticity of some very deep 
'assumptions' implicit in visual processing, such as the specific orientation of the 
visual world relative to one's other sense modalities and to one's motor systems. If 
assumptions as deep as these can be re-shaped in a week or two, then our perception 
begins to look very plastic and very penetrable indeed. (Churchland, 1988: 174-5) 
 
 When subjects first put on the inverting lenses (that had "the effect of inverting the 
orientation of all visual information relative to the body's tactile and motor systems”), everything 
apparently looked upside down  (as you would expect). However, according to Churchland, it was 
found that after subjects had been wearing the lenses for roughly a week, things no longer looked 
upside down—“the illusion of the world being upside down is said to fade away”. 
 As I mentioned in the introduction, one reason people have for doubting the existence of 
cognitive penetration is the fact that illusions persist even after we come to know that the illusions 
are not as they appear and how they really are. Take, for example, the Müeller-Lyer lines,  I know 
full well that the lines are the same length, and I've known it for some time. And at this point, I've 
spent dozens or hundreds of hours reading about, thinking about, arguing about, and talking about 
the illusion. And yet, despite that, the illusion has not dissipated in the least—the lines still look 
different me!  
 The passage I quoted above is part of Churchland’s response to the persistence of illusions 
objection to the existence of cognitive penetration. He presents the experiment as a way of 
undermining that objection. The inverting lenses experiment, he claims, shows empirically that 
illusions do fade away — just not quickly or easily.  
 As a response to the persistence of illusions objection, I think Churchland’s response is 
wrongheaded and confused in a number of ways. But, for the purposes of this paper, I'm only 
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interested in this response insofar as it is an expression of his apparent belief — a belief that has 
subsequently been shared by several others — that the illusion fading away is empirical evidence of 
cognitive penetration.19 
 Opponents of cognitive penetration could respond to Churchland's claim that the illusion 
fading away is evidence of cognitive penetration in the same way they have responded to empirical 
 evidence from studies reportedly finding top-down effects — namely, by denying the reported 
findings hold up. In this case, that would mean denying that the illusion really faded away after 
subjects had been wearing the inverting lenses for a week. 
 Churchland’s presentation invites us to think that the illusion fading away was a 
straightforward and uncontroversial (if surprising) experimental observation. So you might not have 
thought denying that the illusion faded away was an option. But that's a mistake. The thesis that the 
                                                
19 Technically, Churchland and others have presented it as empirical evidence of diachronic cognitive 
penetration. Churchland says the debate over cognitive penetration has (implicitly) been focused on whether 
cognition directly influences perception quickly, over very short periods of time. But that’s just about synchronic 
cognitive penetration. And he thinks that makes the discussion too narrow. He says the debate over cognitive 
penetration is a debate over whether cognition directly influences perception, period. And that means the 
debate is also about whether cognition influences perception over a long period of time (e.g. days, weeks, months, 
or even years), i.e. diachronic cognitive penetration. 
 As a conceptual matter, this is surely right. There’s nothing problematic about the concept of 
diachronic cognitive penetration. Churchland and Stokes make a lot of this point. But as far as I know, so 
does everyone else. I don’t know of anyone who argues diachronic cognitive penetration is conceptually 
incoherent. But remember the conceptual (metaphysical or nomic) possibility of cognitive penetration 
(diachronic or otherwise) is neither here nor there. No one denies that cognitive penetration is possible. The 
debate is about whether it’s actual.  
 So technically, Churchland and others think the inverting lenses experiment is empirical evidence of 
diachronic cognitive penetration. Since the reported finding is that illusion faded away over the course of a 
week, if it was evidence of cognitive penetration, I suppose it would be evidence of diachronic cognitive 
penetration. However, I will argue the claim that the illusion fading away—and adaptational effects more 
generally—evidence of cognitive penetration, diachronic or otherwise, is wrong (and possibly confused). So 
the question of whether it evidence of diachronic, as opposed to synchronic, cognitive penetration is, largely a 
distraction. It makes no difference whatsoever until I consider whether adaptational effects could empirical 
evidence of weak cognitive penetration (Section 6). So until I get to that point, I’m going to ignore this 
distinction, and talk simply in terms of cognitive penetration. 
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illusion faded away after subjects had been wearing the lenses for a week is an interpretation of the 
data and observations collected from subjects verbal reports about their experiences, as well as 
improvements in their abilities (e.g. abilities to navigate their environment). To be fair, Churchland is 
not going his own way here, that is an interpretation shared by a number of people, including some 
psychologists involved with the study. However, that interpretation is far from mandatory and has 
been rightly criticized.20 
 Even though I'm not convinced that the illusion faded away, I don't think denying the 
illusion faded away is the best approach to responding to this evidence. The illusion fading away is a 
(purported) example of an adaptational effect, i.e. an effect on perceptual experience resulting from 
changes in the way perceptual system(s) process information (i.e. processing adaptations). Even 
though there is reason to doubt that an adaptational effect was found in this experiment, there’s no 
question that adaptational effects exist. So I'm just going to assume that the illusion actually faded 
away. My goal is to argue that the illusion fading away isn’t evidence of cognitive penetration 
because to be evidence of cognitive penetration the illusion fading away would have to be a case of 
cognitive penetration, and it's completely implausible that any adaptational effects are cases of 
cognitive penetration. 
                                                
20 Eric Schwitzgebel (unpublished blog post XXX) and Jesse Prinz (see Stokes ftntXXX) have both 
called into question that interpretation. For example, Switzgebel argues that subjects’ verbal reports 
seem to support the conclusion that their visual experience was unchanged. Rather, subjects became 
accustomed to things looking upside down—e.g. learning to associate things looking to be up with things 
being near the ground. This sort of learned association can also explain why subjects were able to 
more skillfully navigate their environment after becoming accustomed to the lenses. In other words, 
none of the empirical findings from this experiment clearly support the claim that the illusion faded 
away. 
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2.4 ARE ADAPTATIONAL EFFECTS CASES OF COGNITIVE PENETRATION? 
 I take the illusion fading away – or any adaptational effect for that matter — can only be 
evidence of cognitive penetration if it is (or would be) a case of cognitive penetration. So in 
presenting the illusion fading away as empirical evidence of cognitive penetration, Churchland and 
others are claiming that it is a case of cognitive penetration. 
 At least first pass, claiming that adaptational effects, like the illusion fading away, are cases of 
cognitive penetration doesn’t seem just wrong, it seems confused. Despite the ongoing debate over 
exactly what cognitive penetration is, it should be uncontroversial that cases of cognitive 
penetration, at minimum, have to be effects on perceptual experiences that were, in some sense, the 
result of cognitive influence. So adaptational effects can only be cases of cognitive penetration if 
they were, in some sense, the result of cognitive influence. But proponents of cognitive penetration 
say explicitly that adaptational effects are the result of processing adaptations or changes in the way 
subjects perceptual systems processed information.21 And processing adaptations are not cognitive 
influences. And, at least on the face of it, have nothing to do with cognition. So, at least on the face 
of it, it’s not even possible for adaptational effects to be cases of cognitive penetration. And if it’s not 
even possible for adaptational effects to be cases of cognitive penetration, claiming they are cases 
seems confused.  
Adaptational effects can only be cases of cognitive penetration if they were, in some sense, the 
result of cognitive influence(s). And on the face of it, it’s not clear that’s even possible, the fact that 
proponents of cognitive penetration present studies reportedly finding adaptational effects  
                                                
21 As I said, it’s not clear that the illusion really did fade away. But if it did, I take it the only plausible way 
to explain that would be in terms of changes in the way subjects visual systems processed information. 
Assuming conditions were more or less the same at the beginning of the experiment, as they were at the end 
(e.g. subjects didn’t begin standing on their heads), what else could explain everything changing from looking 
upside down to looking right side up? 
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without any argumentation is baffling. But that aside, you might wonder whether anything can be 
said on their behalf. In other words, is there any way the illusion fading away could be a case of 
cognitive penetration? 
2.5 AN UNWARRANTED ARGUMENT 
Is it possible for adaptational effects to be cases of cognitive penetration? Adaptational effects 
can only be cases of cognitive penetration if they, in some sense, result from (direct) cognitive 
influence. But adaptation effects, by definition, result from processing adaptation(s).22 So I take it the 
only way adaptational effects could, in some sense, result from cognitive influence is if cognitive 
influence was somehow involved in bringing about the relevant processing adaptations (i.e. the 
processing adaptations that were responsible for bringing about the adaptational effects). Let's call 
processing adaptations brought about, at least in part, by cognitive influence cognitively influenced 
(processing) adaptations. The only way adaptational effects could be cases of cognitive penetration if 
they resulted from cognitively influenced adaptations. 
So I assume the basis for proponents of cognitive penetration claiming that empirical studies 
reportedly finding adaptational effects, like the experiment reportedly finding that the illusion faded 
away, show there’s cognitive penetration, is their un-argued-for conviction that the adaptational 
effects in the studies they point to are the result of cognitively-influenced processing adaptations. If 
we assume that's the case, then we can get the conclusion that the adaptational effects in question 
(e.g. the illusion fading away) are cases of cognitive penetration via the following simple argument:: 
(1) Adaptational effects are the result of cognitively influenced adaptations. 
(2) If adaptational effects are the result of cognitively influenced adaptations, they are genuine 
cases of cognitive penetration.  
                                                
22 I'm assuming the claim that adaptational effects like the illusion fading away are result of processing 
adaptations is not up for grabs (if the illusion really did feel way, I take it that the only plausible explanation 
for that would be in terms of processing adaptations). 
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(3) So adaptational effects are genuine cases of cognitive penetration. 
 
The problem, however, is that neither premise of this argument is warranted. 
2.5.1 Re (1): Cognitively-Influenced vs. Bottom-up Adaptations 
Let's first consider premise (1), according to which adaptational effects are the result of 
cognitively influenced processing adaptations. For that to be true, it has to be the case that the 
relevant changes in perceptual processing (i.e. those changes in processing responsible for bringing 
about the adaptational effects) were caused (or in some other way brought about) at least partly by 
subjects’ cognitive state(s). 
Broadly speaking, there are only two ways that could have happened: either the relevant 
processing adaptations were caused entirely by influence from subjects’ cognitive states or the 
processing adaptations were caused partly by influence from subjects’ cognitive states and partly by 
something else. Let's call cognitively influenced adaptations caused entirely by influence from 
cognition top-down adaptation, and cognitively influenced adaptations caused partly by influence 
from cognition and partly by something else mixed adaptations. For premise (1) to be true, it has to 
be the case that adaptational effects they point to were either the result of top-down or mixed 
adaptations.  
Whether subjects’ cognitive states were involved in bringing about the processing adaptations 
responsible for bringing about the adaptational effects they point to, is ultimately an empirical 
question. But I want to bracket the empirical question, for the moment, and talk about the space of 
possibilities.  
I grant that it's possible that subjects’ cognitive states were involved. But it's also possible that they 
were not. It’s possible that the relevant processing adaptations were caused or otherwise brought 
about entirely by non-cognitive factors (e.g. sensory deprivation and training on perceptual stimuli). 
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Let’s call processing adaptations brought about entirely by non-cognitive factors bottom-up adaptations. 
I take it it’s at least possible that adaptational effects in question, like the illusion fading away, were 
entirely the result of bottom-up adaptations. And if it’s possible that the adaptational effects in 
question were brought about by bottom-up adaptations, proponents of cognitive penetration are not 
entitled to premise (1) unless we have reason to think all processing adaptations are (in fact) 
cognitively-influenced (i.e. cognition is always involved) or we have some special reason to think that 
subjects cognitive states were involved in the particular experimental cases in question. Let’s 
consider each of these options in turn. 
It has long been known that the way our perceptual systems process information can (and does) 
change over time – i.e. that there are processing adaptations. For example, deprivation experiments 
done on animals have shown that long periods of sensory deprivation (especially during critical 
periods of development) have a profound impact on the animals’ perceptual systems. In one 
experiment, kittens’ eyelids were sewn shut for six months, depriving their visual systems of sensory 
stimulation during a critical period of development. Brain imaging and dissection revealed gross 
morphological differences between the brain areas associated with visual processing between the 
experimental and control kittens. And given the behavioral differences between these groups, the 
inference that these gross morphological differences resulted in (visual) experiential differences is 
well supported.  
The evidence from animal experiments is corroborated by observational studies with human 
subjects. Some babies are born with opaque cataracts that effectively make them blind. Those 
cataracts can be surgically removed in infancy with little to no long-term side effects. However, there 
have been cases where the cataracts are not removed (due primarily to lack of funds for the surgery). 
These individuals then grow up blind—and thus their visual systems are deprived of sensory 
stimulation during critical periods of development. But here’s where the relevant data comes in. A 
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select few of these individuals have had their cataracts removed in late adolescence or early 
adulthood (but after a childhood of blindness) . These individuals (currently, their numbers are in 
the double digits) constitute “natural” deprivation experiments on humans. And the results of those 
experiments are the same as they are in animals. Namely, neural imaging of the visual areas of their 
brains shows gross morphological differences. And their verbal reports and behaviors indicate that 
their visual experiences (after the cataracts are removed) are unlike the visual experiences of the rest 
of us (Dengenaar, 2014; Scholl, 1999). 
And all that evidence is further corroborated by the results from perceptual training experiments 
done with humans. Neural imaging on "trained" areas of subjects perceptual systems before and 
after intensive periods of training, reveal significant structural changes within those areas. And the 
fact that subjects in these experiments improve on tasks like visual discrimination, suggests that the 
structural changes within their perceptual systems resulted in experiential differences (which allowed 
them to perform better on discrimination tasks). 
I don’t know of any reason to think that cognitive influences are always involved in bringing 
about processing adaptations. In fact, if anything, the evidence from sensory deprivation and 
perceptual training experiment suggests that processing adaptations are brought about entirely by 
bottom-up adaptations. And if there are some bottom-up adaptations, it’s false that cognitive 
influence is always involved.  
Do we have any reason to believe that cognitive influences had to be involved in the processing 
adaptations responsible for bringing about adaptational effects like the illusion fading away? Not 
that I can see. In fact, in the passage I quoted earlier, Churchland suggests the processing 
adaptations responsible for the illusion fading away were caused by “continue[d]…interact[ion] with 
familiar objects and engage[ment] in normal forms of motor behavior.” He only mentions subjects’ 
cognitive states to say this:  
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When the lenses were first put on, and the world is made to appear upside down, the 
subjects are of course quite aware of what the lenses are doing. They may even know how 
they do it. But the illusion is not banished by the mere possession of this information. It 
would clearly be wrong, however, to draw from this any conclusion about the 
impenetrability of our visual processors. (Churchland, 1988:174) 
 
 For it to even be possible – never mind actual – that adaptation effects like the illusion fading 
away are genuine cases of cognitive penetration, it has to be the case that they were the result of 
cognitively influenced adaptations (i.e. either top-down or mixed adaptations). I can't categorically 
deny that they were. However, my point is that, proponents of cognitive penetration have given us 
no reason whatsoever to believe that they were. And since we also have no reason to believe that 
cognitive influences are always involved in bringing about processing adaptation,  premise (1) of the 
argument is unwarranted. To put it another way, unless my opponents rule out the possibility that 
the illusion faded away as a result of bottom-up adaptations, they can’t rely on premise (1).  
2.5.2 Re (2): Cognitively-Based Processing Adaptations vs. Cognitive Penetration 
But even if we assume that premise (1) is true (i.e. that the adaptational effects like the illusion 
fading away are the result of cognitively influenced adaptations), it doesn't follow that the 
adaptational effects are cases of cognitive penetration. If premise (1) is true, the adaptational effects 
meet the minimum required for being genuine cases of cognitive penetration – namely, they are 
effects on perceptual experience that are in some sense the result of cognitive influence. But 
adaptational effects can, of course, meet the minimum required without actually being cases of 
cognitive penetration. As I discussed in section 2, there are plenty of effects on perceptual 
experiences that are in some sense the result of cognitive influence that are not cases of cognitive 
penetration (e.g. effects on perceptual phenomenology that are the result of indirect cognitive 
influence). So the question now is whether adaptational effects resulting from cognitively influenced 
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adaptations are (or would be) genuine cases of cognitive penetration. To get from the claim that the 
adaptational effects in question were the result of cognitively influence adaptations the conclusion 
that adaptational effects are genuine cases of cognitive penetration, we need premise (2). 
Even if we assume the adaptational effects in question resulted from cognitively influenced 
adaptations, those adaptational effects are only genuine cases of cognitive penetration and if they 
also meet the direct this requirement and semantic constraint. Do it the adaptational effects in 
question meet these further conditions? I'll consider each in turn. 
2.5.2.1. The Directness Requirement 
Suppose you’re walking home late at night and start to fear you’re being followed; to assuage 
your fear, you turn your head to look. Unless circumstances are highly unusual, after you turn your 
head, your visual experiences will be different (than it was before). Since you turned your head 
because you were afraid, there's a clear sense in which the effect on your visual experience was, at 
least in part, the result of influence from your cognitive states. 
However, as I pointed out in section 2, it's widely agreed that effects on perceptual experience 
like this do not count as cases of cognitive penetration. The diagnosis for this is that such effects are 
only the result of indirect influence from cognition. In other words, in this situation, the influence 
from your cognitive states was indirect or mediated. Your fear only influenced your visual 
experience in the sense that it prompted you to turn around. But it was turning around that changed 
what you were looking at (i.e. your visual stimuli), and thus your visual experience. The influence 
from your cognitive states was neither necessary nor sufficient for the affect on your visual 
experience. In other words, that effect on your visual experience fails to meet the directness 
requirement. 
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If we maintain that directness requirement, adaptational effects can't be cases of cognitive 
penetration unless they, in some sense, resulted from direct influence from subjects’ cognitive states. 
But that doesn't seem possible. Even if the adaptational effects were the result of top-down or 
mixed adaptations, it seems to me that the influence from subjects cognitive states would be 
indirect. At least on the face of it, adaptation effects resulting from top down or mixed adaptations 
result from cognition in the same sense that the effect on your visual experience resulted from 
cognition in the above scenario. And we've already seen that the effect on your visual experience in 
the above scenario does not count as a case of cognitive penetration. 
 
Figure 1: Variations of (In)direct Cognitive Influence 
 
Since the effect on your visual experience doesn't count as a case of cognitive penetration 
because of the indirect nature of the influence from cognition, unless we have some reason to 
believe the indirectness of the cognitive influences when it comes to adaptational effects is different, 
then even if they result from top-down or mixed adaptations, arguably, they could not be       cases 
of cognitive penetration. 
2.5.2.2. The Semantic Constraint 
Even if we relax the directness requirement – and allow that some effects on perceptual 
experience resulting from indirect cognitive influence are cases of cognitive penetration – 
adaptational effects can't be cases of cognitive penetration unless they also meet the semantic 
constraint. For an effect on perceptual experience resulting from direct cognitive influence is only a 
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case of cognitive penetration if it is semantically or logically related to the cognitive states doing the 
influencing. For example, all the empirical studies reportedly finding top-down effects reported 
uncovering differences between subjects’ perceptual experiences as a result of some sort of cognitive 
differences. For example, studies reportedly finding that faces with stereotypical African-American 
features looked darker (in skin tone) than faces with stereotypical Caucasian features (that were just 
as dark), that expecting bananas to be yellow made images of bananas look yellower, and expecting 
lips to be red made lip shaped cutouts look redder, that being depressed made things look darker, 
and even that wearing heavy backpack made hills look steeper. In each of these examples, there’s a 
non-arbitrary connection between what the cognitive state(s) are about and the effect on perceptual 
experiences their influence brings about.  
Processing adaptations are changes in the way perceptual systems process information. It's not 
clear that such changes have semantic content. And if they don't, there can't be a semantic 
connection between adaptational effects and either top-down or mixed adaptations. But perhaps we 
can look to the semantic contents of the influencing cognitive states 
To summarize, if cases of cognitive penetration have to meet both the directness requirement 
and semantic constraint, arguably, adaptational effects wouldn't be cases of cognitive penetration 
even if they were the result of top-down or mixed adaptations. And since resulting from top-down 
or mixed adaptations is the only way adaptational effects could be the result of cognitively 
influenced adaptations, premise (2) is false. 
2.6 WEAK COGNITIVE PENETRATION 
I argued in the previous section that at adaptational effects like the illusion fading away are not 
cases of cognitive penetration even if they resulted from top-down or mixed adaptations because 
they fail to meet both that directness requirement and semantic constraint. However, both of those 
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conditions have called into question (e.g. Stokes, 2015; Wu, 2013). Since I don't want to adjudicate 
those dispute here; and it may still be interesting if there are adaptational effects that are the result of 
top-down or mixed adaptations. So let's just assume that cases of cognitive penetration need not 
meet those further conditions (or any other similar conditions). 
Presumably, however, adaptation will affect that don't meet those further conditions would be 
weaker cases of cognitive penetration than ones that do. Let's call them weak cases of cognitive 
penetration. The question I want to explore in this section is whether adaptational effects resulting 
from top-down or mixed adaptations would be cases of weak cognitive penetration. I’ll first address 
the conceptual question of whether such adaptational effects could be cases of weak cognitive 
penetration. I conclude that it is, indeed, possible. But ultimately, all that matters for our purposes is 
the empirical question of whether actual adaptational effects (e.g. the illusion fading away) are cases 
of the weak cognitive penetration. And I argue that we have no reason to believe that any of the 
actual adaptational effects are the result of top-down or mixed adaptations. As I suggested, the 
empirical evidence for processing adaptations suggests they are the result of entirely noncognitive 
factors (i.e. they are bottom-up adaptations). 
2.6.1 The Conceptual Question 
I take it whether adaptational effects resulting from cognitively influenced adaptations would 
count as cases of weak cognitive penetration depends on how subjects’ cognitive states influenced 
the relevant processing adaptations.  
In particular, I would argue that to count as cases of weak cognitive penetration, subjects’ 
cognitive states had to play a direct role in bringing about the relevant processing adaptations. To 
allow for the possibility that adaptational effects are cases of cognitive penetration, we have to relax 
the directness requirement, and allow that some effects on perceptual experience resulting from 
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indirect cognitive influence our cases of cognitive penetration. However, we know for certain that 
some effects on perceptual experience resulting from indirect cognitive influence definitely would 
not even count as weak cases of cognitive penetration, e.g. effects resulting from a head turn. So the 
trick will be to distinguish between those cases where the indirect influence is problematic and those 
cases in which it is not. Even though I’m relaxing the directness constraint (i.e. allowing that indirect 
influences from thought can count as cognitive penetration), I’m not getting rid of it entirely. Some 
kinds of indirect influence from cognition definitely would not be cognitive penetration, that’s not 
up for debate. So if thought only plays an indirect role in bringing about the processing adaptations 
in question, presumably any resulting adaptational effects would not be even cases of weak cognitive 
penetration. In other words, I’m only willing to grant that adaptational effects are (or would be) 
cases of weak cognitive penetration, if cognition played a direct role in bringing about the processing 
adaptations in question.  
I’m willing to grant that adaptational effects resulting from top-down or mixed adaptations are 
cases of weak cognitive penetration as long as cognition played a direct role in bringing about the 
relevant processing adaptations. I don’t have a precise way of cashing out the difference between 
cases where cognition plays a direct role and cases where cognition only plays an indirect role. But 
here’s an intuitive gloss. Suppose I learn that daily eye exercises can, over time, improve my visual 
acuity by changing the way my visual system processes visual stimuli; and that prompts me to do the 
daily exercises. And suppose that doing those exercises does, in fact, change the way my visual 
system processes visual stimuli, which, in turn, improves my visual acuity. Changing my visual acuity, 
will change my visual experiences. In this scenario, my cognitive states definitely played a role in 
bringing about the processing adaptations responsible for improving my visual acuity. But my 
cognitive states only played an indirect role in bringing about the processing adaptations in question. 
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And arguably that's not enough for the adaptational effects in question to count as cases of weak 
cognitive penetration. 
I’m willing to just grant that adaptational effects resulting from top-down adaptations would be 
cases of weak cognitive penetration. But when it comes to adaptational effects resulting from mixed 
adaptations, things are a bit more complicated. Let’s draw a distinction between mixed adaptations 
where cognition played a direct role in bringing about the processing adaptations and mixed 
adaptations where cognition only played an indirect role in bringing them about. Let’s call the 
former direct mixed adaptations and the latter indirect mixed adaptations. If what I’ve said is correct, 
adaptational effects resulting from direct mixed adaptations are (or would be) cases of cognitive 
penetration, but not adaptational effects resulting from indirect mixed adaptations. Presumably, 
adaptational effect resulting from indirect mixed adaptations would fail to be cases of weak cognitive 
penetration for the same reason that effects on perceptual experiences resulting from head turns fail 
to be cases of full blown cognitive penetration. 
Since it's in principle possible that the processing adaptations responsible for the adaptational 
effects in question were either top-down or direct mixed adaptations if we can see it that adaptation 
all effects resulting from top-down and direct makes adaptations are (or would be) cases of weak 
cognitive penetration, then it's at least possible that the adaptational effects are cases of weak 
cognitive penetration. 
If we concede that adaptation all effects resulting from top-down or direct mixed adaptations are 
(or would be) weak cases of cognitive penetration, and we grant that it's possible the adaptational 
effects like the illusion fading away were the result of top-down or direct mixed adaptations, then it 
follows that proponents of cognitive penetration weren't confused in claiming that adaptational 
effects are cases of cognitive penetration. 
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 However, proponents of cognitive penetration need to establish that adaptational effects like 
the illusion fading away are cases of cognitive penetration, not just that it’s possible. But that's not 
something my opponents get for free. It's also possible that the illusion faded away as a result of 
bottom-up or indirect mixed adaptations, and that's clearly not a case of cognitive penetration. And 
to do that they need to establish that the adaptational effects were the result of top-down or direct 
mixed adaptations. 
2.6.2 The Empirical Question 
So far I've argued it’s in principle possible that adaptation all effects like the illusion fading away 
our cases of weak cognitive penetration. However, the mere possibility is not enough for 
proponents of cognitive penetration. Remember, they don't just claim that it's possible that 
adaptational effects like the illusion fading away our cases of (weak) cognitive penetration, they claim 
such effects actually are cases of cognitive penetration.  
So the question I want to address now is whether we have any reason to only believe that 
adaptational effects like the illusion fading away are a result of either top-down or direct mixed 
adaptations. In a passage I quoted earlier, Churchland explicitly says that the illusion didn't fade away 
as a result of subjects’ cognitive state alone. 
…the subjects are of course quite aware of what the lenses are doing. They may even know 
how they do it. But the illusion is not banished by the mere possession of this information. 
(Churchland, 1998:174) 
 
So presumably it’s safe to conclude that the illusion didn't fade away as a result of top-down 
adaptations. And that means the only way it could be a case of cognitive penetration is if it was the 
result of direct mixed adaptation(s).  
I admit that it's possible. But as I said before, it’s also possible that it was the result of bottom-
up or indirect mixed adaptations. Whether the illusion fading away was the result of direct mixed 
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adaptations – and thus a case of the cognitive penetration – or the result of bottom-up or indirect 
mixed adaptations – and thus not a case of cognitive penetration – is an empirical question. 
Proponents of cognitive penetration give some reason to think that what actually happened. In other 
words, they need to establish that subjects’ cognitive states played a direct role in bringing about the 
processing adaptations responsible for the illusion fading away. 
I can't show that the illusion didn't fade away as the result of direct mixed adaptations, but I also 
don't think we have any reason to think it did. All the empirical evidence suggests that processing 
adaptations are the result of non-cognitive or bottom-up factors. And the illusion fading away seems 
to be no exception. Churchland himself suggests that the illusion faded away as a result of subjects 
continued engagement with their environment and familiar objects. 
So I conclude that even if it's conceptually possible for the illusion fading away to be a case of 
cognitive penetration, we have no reason to believe it actually is. And the claim that the inverting 
lenses experiment is empirical evidence of cognitive penetration is completely unconvincing. 
2.7 GENERALIZING 
Up to this point I've been focused on the inverting lenses experiment and whether the illusion 
fading away is a case of (weak) cognitive penetration. But the inverting lenses experiment is only one 
of the empirical studies reportedly finding adaptational effects that proponents of cognitive 
penetration contend show there’s (diachronic) cognitive penetration.  
There is nothing unique about my argument against the claim that the inverting lenses 
experiment shows there’s cognitive penetration. It applies mutatis mutandis to all other empirical 
studies reportedly finding adaptational effects that have been presented as empirical cases of 
cognitive penetration. 
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Proponents of cognitive penetration have also claimed an empirical study reportedly finding 
cross-cultural differences in subject susceptibility to visual illusions (e.g. the Muller-Lyer lines) shows 
there is (diachronic) cognitive penetration (McCauley and Henrich, 2006). 
 
The results for the Muller­-Lyer stimuli show substantial differences among these social 
groups in their susceptibility to the illusion. American adults in Evanston, Illinois are the 
most susceptible. On average, these adults require that segment to be about a fifth longer 
than bbefore they perceive them as equal in length (PSE= 19%). At the other end of the 
‘‘susceptibility spectrum,’’ hunter ­gathers from the Kalahari Desert are virtually immune to 
the ‘‘illusion.’’ (They probably would not even recognize it as an illusion.) This population, 
on average, requires that segment  to be only one percent longer than segment bbefore 
seeing them as equal (PSE = 1%). (McCauley and Henrich, 2006: 93) 
 
This study apparently exposed subjects from around the world to various visual illusions (e.g. the 
Muller-Lyer lines), and reportedly found that subjects from Western cultures were more susceptible 
to the illusions than subjects from the non-Western cultures. So, for example, when it comes to the 
subjects from Western cultures, the Muller-Lyer lines must be very different links before subjects 
will visually experience them as the same. But apparently, subjects from non-Western cultures 
visually experienced the lines as the same length when the lines were actually very close to being the 
same length – that's the sense in which these individuals are less susceptible to the illusion. 
McCauley and Hendrich claim these findings show that subjects’ visual experiences (of the 
illusions) were cognitively penetrated. I haven't looked into this study myself, so I don't know 
whether the authors claim that there were cross-cultural differences in the way subjects visually 
experienced the illusions is an interpretation warranted by the experimental findings. However, let’s 
assume it is. For cross-cultural differences in subjects’ visual experiences of the illusions to show 
that subjects’ visual experiences were cognitively penetrated (over a long period of time), it would 
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have to be the case that the differences in subjects’ visual experiences were the result of direct 
influence from their cognitive states.  
But McCauley and Henrich explicitly say that the differences in subjects’ susceptibility to 
illusions were a consequence of variations in the way their visual systems processed visual (and 
perhaps other sensory) stimuli/information. And the claim is that there were differences in the way 
subjects’ visual systems processed information across cultures because they had grown up in 
different environments. And those different environments had shaped their perceptual systems 
differently (NB the carpentered environments hypothesis). 
 
Explanations for the observed cultural variation in people’s susceptibility to visual illusions 
center around the...notion that the human visual processing system will somehow adapt to 
the local visual environment by building up biases that tend to produce useful inferences in 
that environment. (ibid., p. 91) 
 
Let’s assume that that adaptation to their local visual environments is the reason there were 
cross-cultural differences in subjects’ visual experiences. That would mean the cross-cultural 
differences are adaptational effects. So this experiment only shows there’s cognitive penetration if 
those adaptational effects are cases of cognitive penetration.  
A third example comes from a recent paper by Ariel Cecchi (2016) in which she argues that 
reported findings from a visual training experiment show there's, what she calls, architectural cognitive 
penetration.23  
                                                
23 Here is how Cecchi defines architectural cognitive penetration: “Architectural cognitive penetration is 
the process whereby the behaviour or the structure of the perceptual system is affected by the 
cognitive system. Cognitive influences can affect the architecture of the system either by guiding the 
function of the system – e.g., saccadic eye movements may be influenced by intentions (Wu 2013) – 
or by modulating its structure – e.g., cognitive influences may elicit neural reorganization in the 
visual cortex (Churchland 1988). Architectural cognitive penetration has an indirect impact on the 
content of perceptual experience. The subject’s cognitive background first influences the 
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The task consisted in an intensive monocular training requiring subjects to report, 
simultaneously, both the identity of an element appearing in the centre of the visual field and 
the orientation of an object located in the periphery...Participants in the experiment were 
divided into two groups. One group of subjects trained the left eye whereas the other trained 
the right...subjects underwent a total of 1,760 trials...performance in the detection of the 
peripheral element’s orientation for the trained and untrained eyes was tested. The results 
indicate a significant improvement in peripheral target detection for the trained but not the 
untrained eye...the perceptual learning task in the target study produced a rapid improvement 
in visual detection. This progress occurred as a result of cognitive influences on the visual system facilitating 
visual detection: electrical activity from higher brain areas affected early stages of the visual processing 
[emphasis added]. The constant repetition of the detection task produced gradual neural 
modulations in the trained region of the primary visual cortex improving performance. 
(Cecchi, 2014: 74) 
 
According to Cecchi, the experiment found that repeated training on a set of visual stimuli 
significantly improved subjects abilities to detect target stimuli. She also claims the improvement in 
subjects’ abilities to detect stimuli "occurred as a result of cognitive influences on the visual system 
facilitating visual detection". 
 Let's assume the study actually found that subjects’ abilities to detect the target stimuli 
improved after a period of training. Does that finding show, as Cecchi claims, that there's 
architectural cognitive penetration? 
 That claim seems problematic on numerous levels. First, the study reportedly found there 
were improvements subjects’ abilities to detect stimuli. But to show there's cognitive penetration 
(architectural or otherwise), the study would need to show there was some kind of an effect on 
subjects visual experiences, i.e. that the training changed how the target stimuli looked to subjects. 
Now perhaps Cecchi has in mind that there couldn't have been an improvement in subjects’ abilities 
                                                                                                                                                       
architecture of the visual system, which consequently may have an impact on the perceptual 
experience. (Cecchi, 2014:63)” 
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to detect stimuli without a corresponding change in their visual experience. That's not crazy. But it is 
a substantive claim in need of defense (which Cecchi does not provide). 
 But even setting that aside, for the changes brought about by the training to be cases of 
cognitive penetration, it would have to be the case that those changes were a result of (direct) 
cognitive influences. In the passage I quoted, Cecchi claims that "the progress [improvement] 
occurred as a result of cognitive influences on the visual system facilitating visual detection". It's not 
clear the results from the trainings support her claim. But even if they do, that shows, at best, that 
cognition influenced the visual system leading to that improvement in subjects’ abilities to detect 
stimuli. But this is an adaptational effect. 
The neural structure of the brain is not rigid and static but plastic and dynamic. Visual 
cortical areas and their functions can be adapted to different perceptual conditions; such 
adaptation is possible thanks to neural reorganization in the visual system. (Cecchi, 2014: 65) 
 
This is another example of an empirical study purportedly finding an adaptational effect. As before, 
I’m not questioning whether the effect on subjects’ visual experiences was actually found, or that the 
effect was the result of changes in the structure of subjects visual systems. But effects on visual 
experiences resulting from changes in the structure of perceptual systems are adaptational effects. And, 
as I’ve argued, Cecchi would need to establish that adaptational effects are cases of cognitive 
penetration. 
 Cecchi contends that the adaptational effects found in the training experiment are cases of 
cognitive penetration because subjects’ attention was involved. More specifically, the study 
reportedly found that there were only changes in subjects visual systems and abilities to detect the 
target stimuli if they were paying attention during the training. And that, she contends, shows subjects 
attention was required to get the relevant visual adaptations (ibid., p.75). 
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 Let's grant that the purported differences in the visual adaptation are real and that those 
differences were the result of influence from subjects’ attention. If we grant those two things it 
follows that influence from subjects attention made a genuine contribution to bringing about the 
visual adaptations in question. But that, by itself, isn't enough to establish that the visual adaptations 
were cases of cognitive penetration. Just because influence from subjects’ attention was needed to 
bring about the visual adaptations in question (i.e. they would not have come about if it weren't for 
the influence from attention), it doesn't follow that the influence from attention played the right 
kind of role (i.e. direct). To put it another way, the fact that influence from subjects attention 
contributed to bringing about the visual adaptations in question, is consistent with the visual 
adaptations being instances of direct mixed adaptations – and therefore cases of cognitive 
penetration – and instances of indirect mixed adaptations – and therefore not cases of cognitive 
penetration. 
2.8 CONCLUSION  
Certainly the primary, if not only, motivation for believing there is cognitive penetration is the 
supposedly compelling empirical evidence of it. But all the empirical evidence of cognitive 
penetration is either from studies reportedly finding top-down effects or from studies reportedly 
finding adaptational effects. 
Proponents of cognitive penetration don't need to convince us that empirical studies finding 
top-down effects would show there is cognitive penetration. That's not even up for debate. Top 
down effects are (or would be) clear cases of cognitive penetration. So there couldn't be top-down 
effects unless there was also cognitive penetration. What they need to convince us of is that top-
down effects were actually found in the empirical studies they discuss.  
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However, when it comes to the empirical studies reportedly finding adaptational effects things 
are the exact opposite. When it comes to these studies, proponents of cognitive penetration don't 
need to convince us that adaptation effects were actually found. Since no one doubts there are 
adaptational effects, we can just assume such effects were actually found in the studies in question. 
The challenge is to convince us that the adaptational effects found in the relevant studies are cases 
of cognitive penetration. 
 Surprisingly, proponents of cognitive penetration offer no such argument. Given that their 
claim that adaptational effects are evidence of cognitive penetration turns on this very issue, the fact 
that no argument whatsoever is offered to substantiate this claim is baffling. However, this would be 
explained if proponents of cognitive penetration think that all adaptational effects, even ones 
resulting from processing adaptations caused by “wider perceptual experience” or, what I’ve called, 
bottom-up adaptational effects count as cases of cognitive penetration. Even if we are willing to 
count effects from top-down and mixed adaptations as cases of cognitive penetration, I take it 
claiming that effects of bottom-up adaptations are also cases of cognitive penetration is a non-
starter.  
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Chapter 3: Against the Perceptual Representation of High-Level 
Properties 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
What are the admissible contents of experience? This question has garnered a fair bit of attention in recent 
years.24 If we suppose experiences are representational, then the contents of experience are (or 
determine) what the experience represents. This question is specifically about what properties feature 
in these contents. That is, what properties are representable by experience. If any experience can 
represent a property, the property is admissible in the contents of experience; otherwise not. 
It will be helpful to have a concrete example. Suppose you’re looking at a bowl of fruit. 
Under normal conditions, you will have an experience that is quite complex—perhaps involving the 
smell of oranges, pangs of hunger, memories of lunch, etc. Ignore everything except for the visual 
aspect of your experience—just what would be missing if you were completely blind. I’ll call this 
your visual experience. From here on, visual experience will be my sole concern. 
What properties does your visual experience, on this occasion, represent? Traditionally, the 
answer would have been exclusively basic or low-level properties, such as colors and shapes. But some 
philosophers, most notably Susanna Siegel, have been arguing the answer also includes some 
sophisticated or high-level properties, such as being a natural kind (e.g. being an apple).25 Just to be 
clear, that we visually represent low-level properties is not in dispute. The only issue up for debate is 
                                                
24 See (Hawley and Macpherson 2011) for a recent collection of papers on the topic. See also (Brogaard 
2012), (Campbell 2013), (Crutchfield 2012), (Deroy, 2013), (Logue, 2013), (Masrour, 2011), (Matey, 2012), 
(Siegel, 2007), (Silins, 2013), (Sorensen, 2013). For a classic argument that we see causation, see (Michotte, 
1963). 
25 I don’t have a nice way carving up properties into low and high. Fortunately, for my purposes that won’t 
much matter. One possibility I’m attracted to is using cognitive penetration to draw the distinction—those 
properties representable in experience without using cognitive penetration are low-level properties, otherwise 
they’re high-level properties. On this way of carving things up, it may be that some properties heretofore 
thought of as paradigmatically high-level (e.g. being a face) turn out to be low-level. 
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whether we visually represent high-level properties too. Proponents of the high-level view say yes; and 
proponents of the low-level view say no. 
My objective in this paper is to make a case for rejecting the high-level view. There are two 
components to my strategy. First, I’ll argue that the most prominent argument for the high-level 
view, the so-called phenomenal contrast strategy, doesn’t offer us any reason to endorse the view. 
Second, I’ll argue that we should reject the view because there isn’t, and can’t be, a plausible 
explanation for how we come to visually represent high-level properties. 
Before moving on, I want to address a question/comment I sometimes hear: isn’t it obvious 
that the high-level view is correct? We definitely see more than, e.g., colors and shapes—we see kinds 
like apples and bananas. Of course, in one sense, that’s undeniable—the objects of our experience 
are (typically) things like apples and bananas, not colors and shapes.26 But no one (in this debate) denies 
that. Easy considerations like this are beside the point; and definitely do not settle the matter in favor 
of the high-level view. You can see an apple without visually representing the property of being a 
apple. Just as you can have beliefs about an apple without cognitively representing the property of 
being an apple. 
3.2 THE PHENOMENAL CONTRAST ARGUMENT 
The most prominent argument for the high-level view, the phenomenal contrast strategy (PCS), is, at 
bottom, an inference to the best explanation, where the thing to be explained is a phenomenological 
difference brought about by gaining a recognitional ability.27 It’s argued that the visual representation 
of high-level properties (or high-level representation) is the best explanation of this difference. If that’s 
                                                
26 However, some philosophers have suggested that, in hallucination, uninstantiated properties are the objects 
of our experience. 
27 The argument was explicitly put forward first by Susanna Siegel; and subsequently, Tim Bayne advocated a 
variation on it. 
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right, we have good reason to think high-level properties are admissible in the contents of visual 
experience; and thus for endorsing the high-level view. 
I’ll argue there’s no apparent reason to think the explanation is in terms of high-level 
representation rather than low-level representation (i.e. the visual representation of low-level properties); 
and thus no apparent reason to endorse the high-level view. Let’s start by looking at the motivation 
for the claim about phenomenal difference. 
Suppose you have never seen a pine tree before and are hired to cut down all the pine trees 
in a grove containing trees of many different sorts. Someone points out to you which trees 
are pine trees. Some weeks pass, and your disposition to distinguish the pine trees from the 
others improves. Eventually, you can spot the pine trees immediately: they become visually 
salient to you...Gaining this recognitional disposition is reflected in a phenomenological 
difference between the experiences had before and those had after the recognitional 
disposition was fully developed (Siegel, 2010:100). 
 
If Siegel is to be believed, learning to recognize pine trees (i.e. gaining the recognitional 
disposition) changes your experience—what it’s like for you to look at pines. In fact, she argues that 
it changes your visual experience, that pine trees look different when you’re disposed to recognize 
them. This is the difference it’s argued can best be explained in terms of a high-level representation. 
Let’s call the experience had before you gain the recognitional ability e1 and the experience after e2; 
and specify the experiences of interest as follows: 
A pair of experiences e1 and e2 such that in the situation leading to e1, S lacks the ability to 
recognize the property F, whereas in the situation leading to e2, S has the ability. Otherwise, 
the situations are as similar as possible. 
 
I refer to these as recognitional cases. Of particular interest are recognitional cases where F is a high-
level property. These are the cases where it’s plausible the phenomenal difference is best explained 
in terms of high-level representation. Here is my rendering of PCS. 
(1)  There’s a phenomenal  difference between e1  and e2 
(2)  If there’s a phenomenal  difference between  e1  and  e2, there’s a difference in the 
 73 
properties  visually represented. 
(3)  If there’s a difference in properties  visually represented,  it’s a difference either in low-
level or high-level properties.28 
(4)  A difference in high-level properties  offers the best explanation  of the phenomenal 
difference. 
(5)  So it’s a difference in high-level properties  (and thus,  the high-level view is true) 
 
I’m prepared to grant premises (1), (2), and (3) for the sake of argument. In other words, I’m willing 
to concede there’s a phenomenal difference brought about by recognition that needs to be explained 
in terms of a difference in properties visually represented. But I’ll argue there’s no reason to think a 
difference in high-level representation (or a high-level difference) is better suited to explain it than a 
difference in low-level representation (or a low-level difference). Let me quickly run through why the 
first three premises are needed, then I will discuss premise (4) at length. To my mind the success of 
the entire argument comes down to what can be said on behalf of premise (4). And what little has 
been said cannot withstand the pressure. 
The first premise is just the intuition, hopefully elicited in the pine tree case, that there’s 
a phenomenal difference brought about by gaining a recognitional ability. Accepting (1) is the 
minimum necessary to get PCS off the ground. Premise (2) is actually the amalgamation of three 
claims, which can be unpacked as follows:  
(2a) If there’s a phenomenal difference between e1 and e2, it’s a difference in visual 
phenomenology.  
(2b) If there’s a difference in visual phenomenology, there’s also a difference in visual 
representation. 
(2c) If there’s a difference in visual representation, it’s a difference in the properties visually 
represented. 
 
According to Siegel, merely reflecting on the pine tree case or ones similar to it should be enough to 
                                                
28Of course, it might be that both low-level and high-level properties make a difference. I’m including this with 
the latter because the debate is over whether we represent low-level properties exclusively or along with high-
level properties. 
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convince you of (1). But she acknowledges it may not be enough to convince you that it’s a 
difference in visual phenomenology. To get you there, she argues other sources of phenomenology 
(e.g. feelings familiarity and imagery associated with memory) don’t offer adequate explanations the 
difference. But this only helps her cause if there’s a connection between visual phenomenology and 
visual representation (i.e. the contents of visual experience). This is indeed the case, if intentionalism is 
true—intentionalism is the thesis that the phenomenology of experience supervenes on its content. 
If so, any difference in visual phenomenology must correspond to, or as I’ve been saying—explained 
in terms of —a difference in visual representation.29 This takes us through (2a) and (2b). The purpose 
of (2c) is to establish that the difference in representation is with respect to properties, as opposed 
to some other type of constituent (e.g. objects). If we assume properties visually represented are 
either low or high-level (premise (3)), there are only two options to explain (1): a low-level difference 
or a high-level difference. To establish that high-level differences offer the best explanation, it either 
has to be shown that low-level differences can’t do it or that they can’t do it as well. I’ll consider 
each of these options in turn. 
Why might proponents of PCS think low-level differences can’t explain (1)? Siegel is not as 
forthcoming about this as one might hope. Here’s what she says. 
In this sort of [recognitional] case, it seems implausible to suppose that there must be a 
change in which color and shape properties are represented before and after one learns...[to 
recognize a property like being a pine tree]. (112) 
 
As I interpret her, Siegel is saying it’s implausible there are low-level differences in every recognitional 
case. And if there are no low-level differences in some recognitional cases, then at least sometimes 
                                                
29 Siegel doesn’t appeal to intentionalism herself. Presumably because it’s a controversial thesis and the fewer 
controversial claims you have to rely on the better. Instead, she argues for the specific claim that this 
phenomenal difference is a representational difference. See Siegel (2010:110 -111). But this doesn’t matter for 
my purposes, because I grant this premise. 
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high-level differences will offer the only, and thus the best, possible explanation. But the question is 
why think there aren’t any low-level differences? Siegel isn’t explicit about this either, but an answer 
is suggested by the very nature of recognitional cases. 
The last line in the specification of recognitional cases reads: Otherwise, the situations are as 
similar as possible. This is included to ensure that recognitional cases are, what Ole Koksvik (2015) 
calls, minimal pairs—cases where the experiences (e1 and e2) arise in situations that only vary with 
respect to recognitional ability and everything else (from the lighting conditions to the subject’s 
viewing perspective and sensory organs) stays the same. This ensures that (1)—which is immediately 
explained by low and/or high-level difference(s)—is ultimately explained by the recognitional 
difference.30 This is important to the success of PCS because, for reasons that are not entirely clear, 
the fact that representational differences have to be explained in terms of the recognitional 
difference makes it plausible that it must be high-level differences. 
I’m willing to grant that the only difference in the situations giving rise to e1 and e2 is with 
respect to recognitional ability. How is this relevant to the issue at hand—why it’s implausible there 
are low-level differences? Here’s the thought: it’s hard to see how recognitional differences could 
explain low-level differences. If that’s right, it’s implausible there are such differences because there’s 
nothing around to explain them.3132 
                                                
30 It may be helpful to think of this on the model of randomized controlled studies in medicine. To figure out 
the impact of a given treatment, the treatment will be given to one group and withheld from another. But it’s 
important that these groups otherwise be as similar as possible. That way there’s nothing besides the 
treatment to explain any differences between the groups. Similarly, if the recognitional ability is the only 
difference in the situations giving rise to e1 and e2 , there’s nothing besides the recognitional ability to explain 
the representational difference. 
31 Nothing around to explain low-level differences would be good evidence there aren’t any, because, if there 
were, there would be something to explain them. 
32 Siegel does consider one possible low-level difference in, what she calls, a pine-tree-shape gestalt. 
Suppose that when you learn to recognize pine trees by sight, your experience comes to represent a 
complex of shapes—leaf shape, trunk shape, branch shape, and overall pine-tree shape. This 
complex is an overall pine-tree gestalt. The pine-tree-shape gestalt is general enough that it can be 
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Ultimately, however, I don’t think this reasoning can be right. Admittedly, it’s not 
immediately apparent how just learning to recognize pine trees could explain a low-level difference. 
But that cuts both ways—it’s not immediately apparent how it could explain a high-level difference 
either. In other words, the fact that recognitional ability is the only variable is no more (or less) 
reason to suspect there aren’t low-level differences, than to suspect there aren’t high-level 
differences. Since, given our other assumptions, it must explain one or the other (or both), that the 
explanation is not immediately apparent isn’t grounds for suspicion.33 
It’s worth noting that appealing to cognitive penetration won’t help. You might think 
cognitive penetration makes it plausible that recognitional differences can explain high but not low-
level differences. But this is a mistake. Cognitive penetration as a mechanism to explain differences 
in visual representation doesn’t favor one kind of difference over the other. If there is cognitive 
penetration, it could bring about low-level differences as easily as high. In fact, the experimental data 
purportedly supporting cognitive penetration (that I’ll discuss in section 3), involves low-level 
differences. Moreover, it’s actually far more plausible that cognitive penetration can be used to explain 
a low-level difference. As I’ll argue in section 4, an explanation involving cognitive penetration and 
high-level differences is extremely implausible. 
However, the fact that (1) must ultimately be accounted for in terms of recognitional 
differences might help shore up PCS by making it plausible that high-level differences make for a 
better explanation (than low-level differences). If that’s right, it doesn’t matter if there are (or could 
                                                                                                                                                       
shared by different-looking pine trees. But it is specific enough to capture the look shared by 
exemplary pine trees. (2010:111) 
She thinks this won’t do because a shape gestalt abstract enough to be invariant over the shapes of actual pine 
trees will be very abstract and “the more abstract a shape-gestalt is, the less reason there is to think that 
experience fails to represent it prior to one’s gaining a recognitional disposition (Siegel, 2010:112).” I don’t 
find a difference in shape gestalt particularly plausible either. 
33 Tim Bayne explicitly allows that there are (or might be) low-level difference(s) in every recognitional case. 
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be) explanations in terms of low-level differences—explanations in terms of high-level differences 
would still be best. But is it right? Is there any reason to think high-level differences make for a 
better explanation? 
Again, Siegel doesn’t address this directly, so we will have to do some reconstructive work. I 
mentioned at the beginning of this section that Siegel argues that the phenomenal difference is a 
difference in the way things look. Charles Siewert makes the same point in the following passage 
from The Significance of Consciousness. 
...your visual experience of sunflowers differs phenomenally depending on whether or not 
you can recognize sunflowers as sunflowers...generally I think we can say that the way things 
look to us alters when we come to recognize what types of things they are....There is a way it 
seems to us to see sunflowers not just as some more shaped and colored things, but as what 
has a distinctively sunflowery look (Siewert, 1998: 256) 
 
I’m not entirely sure I know what a “distinctively sunflowery” look is, or for that matter 
what a “look” is. But setting those issues to one side, you might think the sunflowery look 
sunflowers take on can better be explained by a high-level difference than a low-level one. The 
thought being that the visual representation of being a sunflower can better explain the distinctive 
look than the visual representation of any other property or properties. Moreover, the reason 
sunflowers take on this look once you’ve learned to recognize them is that you come to visually 
represent the property of being a sunflower for the first time. 
Once again, I’m willing to just grant that there is a distinctive sunflowery look that 
sunflowers take on when you’ve learned to recognize them. However, I deny that this is better 
explained by the visual representation of the property of being a sunflower, than any other property 
or properties. Or at least I’m not willing to grant it without argument. Here’s at least one reason to 
think the sunflowery look is not best explained by the visual representation of being a sunflower. 
The visual representation of being a sunflower should, at least first pass, be cashed out as looking to 
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be a sunflower. But, as Alex Byrne (2009) has pointed out, looking to be F is importantly different 
than looking F. He gives the example of a naked mole rat looking old. It’s looking old is decidedly not 
it’s looking to be old—in fact, it may even look to be young! The rat looks old, if anything, because of 
it’s wrinkly and hairless appearance—an appearance mole rats have regardless of age. Far from being 
the best, an explanation of the mole rat looking old in terms of the visual representation of the 
property being old is not even a reasonable explanation. Why should we think the sunflowery look is 
any different? 
You might be tempted to think the sunflowery look of sunflowers is different than the old 
look of mole rats because of how the former came about, namely by learning to recognize 
sunflowers. Plausibly, this consists in learning to recognize things as being sunflowers.; and thus the 
look things take on is looking to be sunflowers. 
It may be the case that the ability to recognize sunflowers is an ability to recognize things as 
being sunflowers.34 But it’s not plausible that the look they take on as a result is looking to be 
sunflowers. After you’ve learned to recognize sunflowers, both real ones and obvious fake ones will 
presumably share the elusive sunflowery look. But obviously fake sunflowers don’t look to be 
sunflowers. So looking sunflowery is not looking to be a sunflower. 
I’ve tried to find reason for thinking that an explanation of (1) in terms of high-level differences is 
the best and come up empty handed. It’s consistent with what I’ve said so far that there is a reason 
that I’ve overlooked. But unless and until we get one, PCS fails as an argument for endorsing the 
high-level view. In what remains, I will make the case that we have good reason to reject the high-
level view—the existence of high-level differences in recognitional cases can’t be plausibly explained. 
                                                
34 I’m not sure about this. Wouldn’t we count someone as being able to recognize sunflowers even if they live 
in fake sunflower country? One reason to think yes is that, upon seeing actual sunflowers, she would identify 
them as such. But the issue is complicated, is a precondition on recognizing something as a sunflower that 
you possess the sunflower concept? 
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3.3 EXPLAINING HIGH-LEVEL REPRESENTATIONS 
Like the differences in phenomenology they explain, differences in visual representation must also 
be explained; and I’ve already granted that this must be done in terms of gaining a recognitional 
ability. So far I’ve been relying on an implicit understanding of recognitional ability, but at this point 
it will be helpful to have something slightly more concrete. Here’s Siegel. 
A perceiver who can recognize trees by sight seems to have some sort of memory 
representation, and some sort of perceptual input, such that the input “matches” the 
memory representation, and the cognitive system of the perceiver registers that this is so. 
(2010:110) 
 
Assuming this is basically right, gaining a recognitional ability consists in difference(s) in one or 
more of the following: stored representations, the matching process, and/or sensory input. The first 
two are, roughly, cognitive components—involving higher level mental processing—and the third is a 
sensory component—involving basic sensory stimulation. So gaining a recognitional ability might 
involve changes to either of these components. However, as I understand it, in recognitional cases, 
the assumption is that the sensory component doesn’t change (I’ll consider relaxing this assumption 
later); so in the relevant cases, there must be change(s) to the cognitive component (or cognitive 
differences) and they must ultimately explain the difference in visual representation (or a visual 
difference). 
Broadly speaking, there are two ways a change in the cognitive component might do this: 
either directly or indirectly. If a change to the cognitive component explains a change to the sensory 
component35 and that explains the difference in visual representation, the cognitive difference 
indirectly explains the visual difference. The following is a simple example. Suppose you believe your 
car is parked off to the left. If you want to see it, you will probably look left because that’s where you 
                                                
35 As I’m understanding it, a change in attention is a change in the sensory component.  
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believe your car is parked. If you do, your visual representation will  change and be different than it was 
before. There’s a clear sense in which your belief explains this difference—if you hadn’t believed as 
you did, it’s substantially less likely you would have looked left and thus that your visual 
representation would have changed in just the way it did. However, if your belief hadn’t explained 
the change to the sensory component, it wouldn’t have explained the difference in visual 
representation. 
A more interesting possibility is a change in the cognitive component explaining a difference 
in visual representation directly—without explaining a change in the sensory component. If the 
cognitive component can do this, there’s cognitive penetration. Apparent examples are discussed in 
empirical psychology.36 In one study, subjects learned a color-letter association and then, upon 
viewing the letters, reported they looked tinted with color. In another, subjects reflected on negative 
words and actions and then reported that the room looked darker than it did before.37 In both 
studies, it appears that changes in cognition alone (without changing the sensory input), explain the 
visual difference. The letters looked one color, then some associations were learned, and they looked 
another color. 
High-level differences have to be explained in one of these two ways. But for there to be an 
indirect explanation, there would need to be a difference in the sensory component and that has 
already been ruled out. So the explanation must be direct, in terms of cognitive penetration. Siegel 
acknowledges as much in the following passage. 
                                                
36 A wave of discussion from the 1950’s is associated with Jerome Bruener and the New Look school. But 
there is currently another wave of discussion happening. See (Firestone and Scholl, in press) for references to 
studies I’ll mention and several others. 
37 Firestone is skeptical that the findings in these studies are genuinely visual. I share his skepticism. 
MacPherson (2012) discuss an experimental finding that a subject’s beliefs about the characteristic color of a 
shape influences the color it looks to be. For example, your belief that heart shapes are characteristically red 
makes heart shaped cutouts look redder to you. 
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One kind of argument for the [High-level] View relies on the idea that non- perceptual 
mental states can influence the contents of visual experience. Accord- ing to this kind of 
argument, a [high-level] property such as the property of being a pine tree can come to be 
represented in visual experience partly in virtue of your ability to recognize pine trees when 
you see them. If so, then your visual experience would be cognitively penetrated [emphasis 
added] by the mental states associated with your recognitional ability. (p.10-11) 
 
The fact that high-level differences are explained this way is significant because cognitive 
penetration is extremely contentious. Traditionally, it has been thought that visual experience is 
cognitively impenetrable or informationally encapsulated—the result of a (mostly) bottom-up 
process, taking sensory input and processing it through a hard-wired visual system.38 Cognitive 
penetration would require a fundamentally different mental architecture—where visual experience 
results from a top-down process that takes cognitive states as inputs. If this were the case, cognitive 
states would be direct inputs to visual processing, and thus changes in cognition could directly 
explain differences in visual representation. 
I won’t try to convince you that there’s no cognitive penetration (though I myself am 
dubious), but I will mention two very different reasons cognitive penetration has been viewed with 
suspicion. The first is the evident imperviousness of experience in cases of illusion. Despite our 
knowledge to the contrary, the lines in the Müller-Lyer illusion continue to look different lengths. If 
visual experience is cognitively penetrable, this kind of recalcitrance is puzzling. The second reason 
has to do with the possible implications for perceptual justification and knowledge. If there’s 
cognitive penetration, it may be that believing really is seeing or that, to use a phrase from philosophy of 
science, “perception is theory laden”. This raises serious questions about whether there is, as Quine 
thought, “a tribunal of the senses” to which we must subject our beliefs for independent confirmation 
(or disconfirmation). 
                                                
38 See (Marr, 1982) for a classic discussion. 
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Given the contentiousness of cognitive penetration, you might wonder whether high-level 
differences can be explained without it. If we maintain that visual differences have to be explained in 
terms of recognitional differences (and I see no reason to give this up), for there to be an alternative 
explanation we have to relax the assumption that there’s no difference in the sensory component.39 
Then it’s at least possible there’s an explanation just in terms of the sensory component or indirectly 
in terms of the cognitive component. However, I’m not optimistic an explanation of either sort can 
be pulled off. 
If Siegel is right, you don’t fail to visually represent being a pine tree in e1 because you lack 
appropriate stimulation (like Mary in her black and white room). You fail to visually represent it 
because you are, in some sense, blind to it. When you’re looking at the grove of trees before you’ve 
learned to recognize pines, instances of the property are right there in front of you, staring you in the 
face; and yet, you fail to see them. But somehow, by gaining the recognitional ability your are able to 
see. To put it poetically, your blindness was a consequence of your ignorance and, thus, your 
knowledge enables you to see. This suggests that you must have a cognitive component to be able to 
visually represent high-level properties.40 If that’s right, an explanation just in terms of the sensory 
component won’t do. No amount of difference to your sensory input could explain you coming to 
visually represent being a pine tree in e2. 
Since no change in just sensory input can explain it, plausibly, no change in cognition can do 
it indirectly. For that to be possible, the visual difference would have to be independent of the 
cognitive component, and the visual representation of being a pine tree is not. Consider again the 
car example I discussed earlier, but add the further detail that when you look left a blue car comes 
                                                
39 Doing so might undermine the motivation to think there are high-level differences that need to be 
explained. But that is beside the point at the moment. 
40 This suggests that at least certain versions of the high-level view (e.g. those which include properties like 
being a pine tree) commit you to being a conceptualist about experiential content. 
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into view; and suppose there’s literally nothing else blue anywhere around. Then your belief explains 
your visual representation of blue. But there’s an important sense in which, nevertheless, your visual 
representation of blue is independent of your belief. Your belief brought about conditions that allowed 
you to exercise an ability you already had. In other words, you could have visually represented blue 
even if hadn’t believed (e.g. an involuntary neck spasm caused the car to come into view). However, 
your visual representation of being a pine tree is not independent of the cognitive state(s) you gain 
when you learn to recognize pines. You couldn’t have visually represented being a pine tree without 
those (or perhaps some other) cognitive states.41 In other words, your visual representation depends 
on the cognitive states, without them you have pine tree blindness. This kind of dependence on 
cognition rules out an indirect explanation. 
If high-level differences can’t be explained in terms of just changes in the sensory 
component or indirectly by changes in the cognitive component, we are left with explanations in 
terms of cognitive penetration. This means endorsing the high-level view comes along with a 
commitment to cognitive penetration. Moreover, it’s unclear that the kind of cognitive penetration, 
which is apparently supported by empirical findings (e.g. in the letter-color association study), is the 
same kind of cognitive penetration needed to explain high-level differences. 
In the studies I mentioned earlier, cognition directly explains the visual representation of 
properties you already have the ability to visually represent. So, for example, your negative thoughts directly 
explain your visual representation of a darker color; but you already had the ability to do that prior 
to having those thoughts. However, in the pine tree case, cognition directly explains the visual 
representation of a property (being a pine tree) that you didn’t have the ability to represent prior to 
having those states. So in the latter but not the former, cognition explains both your very ability to 
                                                
41 I assume Siegel doesn’t think the cognitive component of recognition is needed in particular (e.g. perhaps 
the cognitive states associated with the ability to verbally describe pine trees would do just as well). 
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visually represent the property and your visual representation of it on this occasion. So endorsing the 
high-level view, not only requires commitment to ordinary cognitive penetration but also to something, 
we might call, enabling cognitive penetration; and presumably, this is even more contentious than the 
ordinary variety. This is a pretty steep price to pay for endorsing a view there’s, at best, very little 
reason to endorse.42 A commitment to cognitive penetration (enabling or ordinary) will be enough to 
put some people off. But I take it Siegel, and others like her, won’t be moved. After all, she was 
committed to cognitive penetration before I argued she had to be. In the next section, I’ll argue her 
explanation is extremely implausible and this is not just because it relies on cognitive penetration. 
3.4 RECOGNITION TO VISUAL REPRESENTATION 
As I understand it, the high-level difference in the pine tree case is explained as follows. In e1  
you don’t visually represent the property of being a pine tree. You have various sensory inputs S1...Sn 
and cognitive states C1...Cn. But you lack the cognitive states constitutive of the ability to recognize 
pine trees. Then, you gain the recognitional ability—e.g. by looking at field guides, visiting 
arboretums, and speaking with experts—acquiring the aforementioned cognitive states, call them Cp. 
When you undergo e2, everything is the same except now you have Cp. But surprisingly, this time 
around, you do visually represent the property of being a pine tree. It’s as if the addition of Cp 
enabled you to visually represent the property. I’ll call this the RR explanation (for recognition to 
representation). 
According to RR, we can come to see new properties (e.g. being a pine tree)—properties we 
were previously blind to—just by learning to recognize them. Imagine a colorblind person started 
seeing red or you starting seeing ultraviolet blue. The claim is that something similar happens to us 
                                                
42 Even if you think there is a phenomenal difference in recognitional cases that, at present, we don’t have a 
satisfactory explanation for without high-level representation, you might want to hold out for something a 
little less costly. 
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when we learn to recognize things. If this is true, it’s surprising (to put it mildly). If you can’t visually 
represent a property, can learning to recognize it really help you overcome your blindness? I’ll argue 
the answer is no for low-level properties, which can be used as the basis for an inductive 
generalization to all properties, low and high. 
Suppose Ruby red color blind and (predictably) also lacks the ability to recognize red when 
she sees it. Imagine she’s given a special pair of glasses that make red things glow (i.e. look to her as 
if they are highly illuminated) and informed of their special power. When she first puts on the 
glasses, she must deliberately think (a relative slow and cognitively demanding process) about the 
power of the glasses and the fact that the glowing indicates the presence of red. However, after 
some weeks or months of wearing the glasses continuously, this becomes less and less deliberate and 
more and more automatic. Eventually she gets so used to the glass that she bypasses the transition 
from glow to red altogether and is immediately aware of red. By the end of the process (if not 
substantially before), Ruby has gained the ability to recognize red when she it. However, she has not 
come to visually represent any new properties, including red, or so it seems to me. She doesn’t 
visually represent red now anymore than she did before she got the glasses. Moreover, it seems 
pretty clear that any way Ruby could learn to recognize red won’t enable her to visually represent it. 
If this is right (and I think it is), RR is false for low-level properties. In other words, RR can’t 
explain low-level differences. This is a strong basis the claim that the falsity of RR generalizes to all 
properties, low and high. If RR can’t explain high-level differences and they can’t be explained in any 
other way (as I argued in the previous section), then we have good reason to think there are no high-
level differences; and thus that the high-level view is false.43 
                                                
43 Consider an analogy. Suppose I’m trying to convince you that a bear has been in my house. The reason I 
give is that it’s the best explanation of the claw marks on my sofa. You might wonder, how did a bear get in 
the house? Suppose there are no signs of forced entry, so I say it must have teleported. That’s not a plausible 
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I can think of three ways my opponent might respond: deny that Ruby has learned to 
recognize red, insist that she has come to visually represent it, or accept that RR is false for low-level 
properties but block the generalization by arguing that the recognition and/or visual representation 
of high and low-level properties is different in a way that’s relevant. I’ll consider the first two 
responses in this section and the last response in the next section. 
The option of denying that Ruby has learned to recognize red is not particularly promising. 
It might be pointed out that Ruby’s way of recognizing red is substantially different than ours. We 
recognize red directly using our visual representations of the property. Whereas Ruby recognizes red, 
if at all, indirectly using her visual representation of the glow plus some background cognitive states 
that link the glow to the property red. 
There is indeed this difference, but it’s unclear why it’s at all relevant to whether Ruby’s 
recognitional ability is genuine. One reason to think the ability is genuine is that Ruby (with her 
glasses on) can do the sorts of things we associate with having a recognitional ability (e.g. identify, 
discriminate, group, and categorize). Pointing out that Ruby’s recognition is indirect and ours is 
direct isn’t reason to think her ability is less genuine. And my opponents would be hoist on their 
own petard if they argued that genuine recognition of a property requires visual representation of it. 
If that were the case, we wouldn’t be able to recognize high-level properties before we came to 
visually represent them and so RR would be false by their own lights. They might try to maintain 
that visual representation of a property is a requirement for genuinely recognizing low but not high-
level properties. The is species of the third option, which I’ll consider in section 5. At this point, 
suffice it to say I’m not optimistic. 
A different option is try arguing that Ruby does come to visually represent red after wearing 
                                                                                                                                                       
explanation for how the bear got in. If there’s no other explanation in the offing, you should conclude that 
there was no bear in the house, and thus it’s not the best explanation of the claw marks. 
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the glasses for a time. Now, perhaps there’s a sense in which Ruby visually represent red—she sees 
that the glow is red. But, if anything, this is a kind of indirect visual representation and that is an 
entirely different beast then what we’ve been talking about until now. No one denies that we can see 
that something is a pine tree. The question is whether we can see something as a pine tree in the way 
we can see it as red. For the high-level view  to be interesting, the answer has to be yes. In other 
words, we must visually represent high-level properties in, roughly, the same way we visually represent 
low-level properties. And the way we visually represent something as red is (typically) directly, not 
indirectly. What makes the high-level view a genuine alternative to the low-level view, is the claim that 
high-level properties feature in the content of visual experience the same way low-level properties 
do. The suggestion now is that high-level properties figure in the contents of a different, but related 
state, we might call seeing-that. This threatens to trivialize the high-level view by reducing it to 
something that everyone already accepts. 
A way to maintain the line of indirect visual representation without trivializing the high-level 
view is to argue that all seeing is seeing that. That is, low-level representation is indirect too. What is 
seeing that or indirect visual representation? Dretske calls it a kind of epistemic seeing, it is a kind of 
seeing that requires the possession of certain concepts or cognitive states. 
The first thing to note is that this way of going seems to commit you to conceptualism about 
experiential content. But commitment to conceptualism may already be required because of the 
commitment to cognitive penetration. 
Another reason to deny that all seeing is seeing that is that, if the possession of certain 
concepts is a precondition on having any sort of visual experience at all and given that our 
experiences are the source of many (most?) of our concepts, then as Dretske (1969) says total 
ignorance would guarantee total blindness” and, furthermore, there would be no way to remedy the 
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situation. This is one reason Dretske insists there is a more basic kind of seeing than seeing that, 
which he calls seeingN. 
3.5 POSSIBLE OBJECTION AND REPLY 
The final option is to accept that RR is false for low-level properties, but insist that it’s true for high-
level properties. This would require blocking the generalization from the failure for low-level 
properties to a failure for high-level properties. This could be done either by establishing a relevant 
difference between the recognition of low and high and/or visual representation of them. Relevant 
differences are differences between low and high that would block the generalization. So to 
successfully use this strategy proponents of the high-level view have to do two things: argue a 
difference is relevant and that there really is that difference. I’ll argue that it’s with regard to the second 
task that the high-level view runs into problems. Any proposed difference must strike a delicate 
balance—too much and it threatens trivializing the view, too little and it won’t be enough to block 
the generalization. 
If there is high-level representation, one thing that seems undeniable is that high-level 
representation somehow depends on low-level representation. More specifically, the phenomenology of 
high-level representation depends on the phenomenology of low-level representation. Why think this? 
Because you can have low-level representation without high-level representation44, but not the other 
way around—if you are low-level blind you will definitely be high-level blind. One thought is that 
the fact that high-level representations are phenomenally dependent whereas low-level representations 
are not is a relevant difference. 
Before considering whether there is this difference between low and high-level 
representation, let’s first discuss why this difference is relevant. That is, how does the fact that high-
                                                
44 According to Bayne, this is what goes on in cases of associative agnosia. 
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level representation is phenomenally dependent make it plausible that RR is true for high-level 
properties but not low? The thought might be something like this: your ability to recognize a 
property F, can only enable you to visually represent F, if the visual representation of F (which you 
don’t yet have) phenomenally depends on the visual representations you use in learning to recognize F. 
The idea is behind this suggestion is that the way you learn to recognize a property is relevant to 
whether your ability to recognize a property can enable you to visually represent it. And the 
phenomenal dependence of the ultimate visual representation on the visual representation involved 
in recognition is required. The motivation behind this suggestion might be that if there’s this kind of 
phenomenal dependence, your visual representations of some properties can help you “get on” to 
the visual representation of others. 
The problem with Ruby, then, is that the visual representation of red is in no way 
phenomenally dependent on her visual representation of the glow, which she uses to recognize red. 
And without the required phenomenal dependence, her recognition of red won’t enable her to 
visually represent red. Ruby’s case is the rule, not the exception when it comes to low-level 
properties because the visual representations of low-level properties are phenomenally basic—they 
don’t depend on any further visual representations. If that’s right, then if you can’t already visually 
represent a low-level property, no way you could learn to recognize it will enable you to visually 
represent it. If low-level properties are phenomenally basic, trivially recognizing a low-level property 
won’t involve visual representations it depends on (except if the recognition involve the property 
itself). 
When it comes to high-level properties, however, the situation is different precisely because 
high-level representation phenomenally depends on low-level representation. Suppose, for example, 
that the visual representation of being a pine tree depends on the visual representation of a 
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distribution of shapes and colors. Then even if you don’t visually represent being a pine tree, using 
your visual representation of the shapes and colors enables you to “get on” to the visual 
representation of being a pine tree. This would explain why RR is true for high-level properties 
despite being false for low-level properties. 
Let’s grant that phenomenal dependence is a relevant difference between low and high- level 
representation (i.e. it would explain the why RR differs in truth value). However, as I mentioned 
earlier, arguing that a difference would be relevant is only half the battle. The other half is to argue 
there is the difference in question. To evaluate the question, we need to figure out the nature of the 
dependence relation—how exactly is it that the visual representation of high-level properties 
depends on the visual representation of low-level properties? If there’s any kind of dependence at 
all, the former will supervene the latter. So if it’s not even plausible that high-level representation 
supervenes on low, it’s not plausible it depends on low at all. 
The simple supervenience thesis is just that high-level representations straight up supervene on 
low-level representations, period. Tim Bayne suggests this possibility in the following passage. 
[Proponents of the high-level view] might argue...that high-level phenomenal content 
supervenes on low-level phenomenal content, so that any change to high-level phenomenal 
content requires a change of low-level phenomenal content. I myself do not do find any 
such view particularly attractive, but I can see nothing in the liberal commitment to high-
level phenomenal content which rules it out. (2011:25) 
 
If simple supervenience is true, for there to be a high-level difference there has to be a low-level 
difference. This means there’s a natural sense in which the high-level difference is explained by the 
low-level difference. 
As far as I can tell, Bayne is right that the high-level view is consistent with simple 
supervenience. However, endorsing it is not an attractive option for proponents of PCS like him and 
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Siegel—it undermines the motivation we had for endorsing the view in the first place. Remember, 
their argument is that we should endorse the high-level view because high-level difference is the best 
explanation of (1). If simple supervenience true, that’s much less plausible. It would ensure, for 
example, that Siegel’s wrong when she says, “it seems implausible to suppose that there must be a 
change in which [low-level] properties are represented [.]” Far from being implausible, if simple 
supervenience is true a change in low-level properties is guaranteed. 
But an alternative is suggested by the role of cognitive penetration in the explanation of 
high-level difference—namely, the cognitive supervenience thesis that high-level representation 
supervenes on low-level representation plus the cognitive component of recognition. 
Cognitive supervenience wouldn’t undermine the motivation for the high-level view 
(because low-level differences wouldn’t be sufficient for high-level differences). Nevertheless, this 
also isn’t an attractive option. To see why, suppose you’re a lepidopterist (i.e. a butterfly expert) and 
that you have the abilities to recognize both monarchs and emperors (i.e. normally, when you see 
them, you can identify them immediately). Moreover, despite their strikingly similar looks (which 
makes them virtually indistinguishable to novices), you have trained enough so that (normally) you 
can immediately distinguish them. Presumably, proponents of the high-level view will say that you 
visually represent both the properties being a monarch and being an emperor. But suppose on this 
occasion you are looking at, what you know to be, a monarch and an emperor, side by side. Yet, for 
some reason (e.g. a morphological anomaly in these particular specimen, your viewing angle, etc.) you 
are unable to tell them apart—indeed, they look identical to you. If you visually represented one as a 
monarch and the other as an emperor, you would be able to tell them apart—they would not look 
identical to you. So it follows from the fact that you can’t tell them apart that the same properties (or 
virtually the same—the same for all you can tell) figure in your visual representations of each. At this 
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point, proponents of the high-level view have four options, they can say you visually represent: (a) 
both as being monarchs, (b) both as being emperors, (c) neither as being a monarch or being an 
emperor, (d) both as being a monarch or an emperor. I’ll argue none of these options is attractive. 
All of these options undermine the cognitive supervenience thesis. Despite your inability to 
discriminate the butterflies on this occasion, you still have the ability to do so in general. So you have 
the cognitive components associated with both the ability to recognize monarchs and the ability to 
recognize emperors and you visually represent the low-level properties upon which the high-level 
ones are supposed to supervene. So it looks like the cognitive components of your recognitional 
abilities plus the low-level representations are not sufficient for the high-level representations. 
An additional problem with (a) and (b) is that both are equally good candidates, and that’s 
one too many. There’s no reason to choose one rather than the other, so any choice would be 
arbitrary. Why say you represent them both as being monarchs rather than as being emperors? You 
may be tempted to doubt this if you’re thinking that monarch are way more common in your 
environment than emperors. In this situation perhaps it would be arbitrary to pick (a). So let’s just 
suppose that monarchs and emperors are, roughly, just as common in your environment. Moreover, 
choosing (a) or (b) would require saying that part of your experience is illusory and that just seems 
wrong. It’s not as though one of the butterflies looks to you to have some property it doesn’t 
actually have. 
But perhaps you weren’t tempted by those options because you think the natural thing to say 
is that in these circumstances, you don’t visually represent either one as being a monarch or as being 
an emperor. But this is bad news for proponents of the high-level view. Despite the fact that you 
can’t discriminate the monarch from the emperor on this particular occasion, they look different to you 
now then they did when you were a novice despite the fact that you’re not visually representing the 
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high-level properties. So clearly, the look they take on when you’ve learned to recognize them can’t 
be explained in terms of high-level representation. 
The remaining option (d) is to say that in this situation you visually represent them both as 
having the disjunctive property of being a monarch or emperor. This strikes me as desperate. In 
addition to standard problems associated with disjunctive properties, saying you visually represent 
them in this situation is completely unmotivated. High-levelists can’t say you normally visually 
represent the disjunctive property (i.e. instead of the natural kind properties) because it’s not even 
remotely plausible that the visual representation of that property is the best explanation of the 
phenomenal difference that came about when you learned to recognize monarchs or emperors. So if 
you do visually represent the disjunctive property, it’s only on occasions like this when you fail to 
discriminate. But then what’s the motivation for saying the property is visually represented? Surely it 
can’t be that the visual representation of the disjunctive property is the best explanation of your 
failure to recognize the butterflies. That stretches credulity a bit too far. Additionally, there’s a 
pressing question about how that property came to be visually represented. It seems unlikely there’s 
any plausible story in terms of cognitive penetration. And given my argument that the explanation 
must be in terms of cognitive penetration, this is an extremely pressing problem. 
3.6 CONCLUSION 
The goal of PCS is to provide us with reason(s) to endorse the high-level view. I have argued it fails to do this 
in two ways: it doesn’t give us any reason to believe and, in conjunction with cognitive penetration, actually 
gives us reason to disbelieve. 
 
 94 
3.7 REFERENCES 
  
[Brogaard 2013] Brogaard, Berit: Do we perceive natural kind properties? In: Philosophical Studies 162 
(2013), July, Nr. 1, S. 35–42 
[Campbell 2013] Campbell, John: Susanna Siegel’s the Contents of Visual Experience. In: 
Philosophical Studies 163 (2013), Nr. 3, S. 819– 826 
[Crutchfield 2012] Crutchfield, Parker: Representing high-level properties in perceptual experience. In: 
Philosophical Psychology 25 (2012), April, Nr. 2, S. 279–294 
[Deroy 2013] Deroy, Ophelia: Object-sensitivity versus cognitive penetrability of perception. In: 
Philosophical Studies 162 (2013), S. 87–107 
[Dretske 1969] Dretske, Fred: Seeing And Knowing. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 1969. – 82  
[Hawley und Macpherson 2011] Hawley, Katherine (Hrsg.) ; Macpherson, Fiona (Hrsg.): The 
Admissible Contents of Experience. Wiley-Blackwell, 2011 
[Koksvik 2015] Koksvik, Ole: Phenomenal Contrast: A Critique. In: American Philosophical 
Quarterly 52 (2015), October, Nr. 4, S. 321–334 
[Logue 2013] Logue, Heather: Visual experience of natural kind properties: is there any fact of the 
matter? In: Philosophical Studies 162 (2013), Nr. 1, S. 1–12 
[Masrour 2011] Masrour, Farid: Is Perceptual Phenomenology Thin? In: Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research LXXXIII (2011), Nr. 2, S. 366–397 
[Matey 2013] Matey, Jennifer: You can see what ‘I’ means. In: Philosophical Studies 162 (2013), Nr. 1, 
S. 57–70 
[Michotte 1963] Michotte, Albert: The Perception of Causality. Basic Books, 1963 
[Pylyshyn 1999] Pylyshyn, Zenon. W.: Is Vision Continuous with Cognition? The Case for Cognitive 
Impenetrability of Visual Perception. In: Behavioral and Brain Science 22 (1999), Nr. 3, S. 
341–365 
[Siegel 2007] Siegel, Susanna: How Can We Discover the Contents of Experience? In: The Southern 
Journal of Philosophy XLV (2007), S. 127–142 
[Siegel 2010] Siegel, Susanna: The Contents of Visual Experience. Oxford University Press, 2010 
[Silins 2013] Silins, Nicholas: The significance of high-level content. In: Philosophical Studies (2013), 
 95 
Nr. 162, S. 13–33 
[Sorensen 2013] Sorensen, Roy: The Twin Towers Riddle. In: Philosophical Studies 162 (2013), S. 109–
117 
 
  
 96 
Complete List of References 
 
Bayne, Tim (2011). “Perception and the Reach of Phenomenal Content.” In: The Admissible Contents of 
Experience. Ed. by Katherine Hawley and Fiona Macpherson. Wiley-Blackwell. 
Bermueacute; and Arnon Cahen (2015). “Nonconceptual Mental Content.” In: The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy. Ed. by Edward N. Zalta. Fall 2015. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. 
Bitter, D ́avid (2014). “Is Low-Level Visual Experience Cognitively Penetrable?” In: The Baltic International 
Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 9.1, pp. 1–26. 
Bourget, David and Angela Mendelovici (2014). “Tracking Representationalism.” In: Philosophy of Mind: 
The Key Thinkers. Ed. by Andrew Bailey. Continuum, pp. 209–235. 
Brogaard, Berit (2013). “Do we perceive natural kind properties?” In: Philosophical Studies 162.1, pp. 35–42. 
Brogaard, Berit and Bartek Chomanski (2015). “Cognitive Penetrability and High Level Properties in 
Perception: Unrelated Phenomena?” In: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96.4, pp. 469–486. 
Bruner, Jerome (1947). “Value and Need as Organizing Factors in Perception.” In: Journal of Abnormal and 
Social Psychology 42, pp. 33–44. 
Campbell, John (2013). “Susanna Siegel’s the Contents of Visual Experience.” In: Philosophical Studies 163.3, 
pp. 819–826. 
Cecchi, Ariel S. (2014). “Cognitive Penetration, Perceptual Learning and Neural Plasticity.” In: Dialectica 
68.1, pp. 63–95. 
Chudnoff, Elijah (forthcoming). “Phenomenal Contrast Arguments for Cognitive Phenomenology.” In: 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research XCI.1, pp. 82–104. 
Churchland, Paul M. (1988). “Perceptual Plasticity and Theoretical Neutrality: A Reply to Jerry Fodor.” In: 
Philosophy of Science 55.June, pp. 167–87. 
Crutchfield, Parker (2012). “Representing high-level properties in perceptual experience.” In: Philosophical 
Psychology 25.2, pp. 279–294. 
Degenaar, Marjolein and Gert-Jan Lokhorst (2014). “Molyneux’s Problem.” In: The Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy. Ed. by Edward N. Zalta. Spring 2014. 
Deroy, Ophelia (2013). “Object-sensitivity versus cognitive penetrability of perception.” In: Philosophical 
Studies 162, pp. 87–107. 
Dretske, Fred (1969). Seeing And Knowing. Vol. 21. 82. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, p. 82. 
–––– (1995). Naturalizing the Mind. MIT Press. 
 97 
Firestone, Chaz (2013). “How ”Paternalistic” Is Spatial Perception? Why wearing a Backpack Doesn’t—and 
Couldn’t—Make Hills Look Steeper.” In: Perspectives on Psychological Science 8.4, pp. 455–473. 
Firestone, Chaz and Brian J. Scholl (2014). ““Top-Down” Effects Where None Should Be Found: The El 
Greco Fallacy in Perception Research.” In: Psychological Science 25.1, pp. 38–46. 
Fodor, Jerry A. (1984). “Observation Reconsidered.” In: Philosophy of Science 51.March, pp. 23–43. 
Fodor, Jerry A. and Zenon W. Pylyshyn (1981). “How Direct is Visual Perception? Some Reflections on 
Gibson’s ’Ecological Approach’.” In: Cognition 9.2, pp. 139–96. 
Gross, Steven et al. (2014). “Problems for the Purported Cognitive Penetration of Perceptual Color 
Experience and Macpherson’s Proposed Mechanism.” In: Though and Perception. Ed. by Edouard 
Machery and Jesse Prinz, pp. 01–30. 
Hawley, Katherine and Fiona Macpherson, eds. (2011). The Admissible Contents of Experience. Wiley-
Blackwell. 
Koksvik, Ole (2015). “Phenomenal Contrast: A Critique.” In: American Philosophical Quarterly 52.4, pp. 
321–334. 
Kuhn, Thomas S. (1962). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. The University of Chicago Press. 
Levin, Daniel T. and Mahzarin R. Banaji (2006). “Distortions in the perceived lightness of faces: The role of 
race categories.” In: Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 135.4, pp. 501–512. 
Logue, Heather (2013). “Visual experience of natural kind properties: is there any fact of the matter?” In: 
Philosophical Studies 162.1, pp. 1–12.  
Macpherson, Fiona (2012). “Cognitive Penetration of Colour Experience: Rethinking the Issue in Light of an 
Indirect Mechanism.” In: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84.1, pp. 24–62.  
Masrour, Farid (2011). “Is Perceptual Phenomenology Thin?” In: Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research LXXXIII.2, pp. 366–397. Matey, Jennifer (2013). “You can see what ‘I’ means.” In: 
Philosophical Studies 162.1, pp. 57–70. 
McCauley, Robert N. and J. Henrich (2006). “Susceptibility to the Muller-Lyer Illusion, Theory-Neutral 
Observation, and the Diachronic Penetrability of the Visual Input System.” In: Philosophical 
Psychology 19.1, pp. 79–101. 
McClelland, Tom (2016). “Gappiness and the case for liberalism about phenomenal properties.” In: The 
Philosophical Quarterly 264, pp. 536–558. 
Michotte, Albert (1963). The Perception of Causality. Basic Books. O’Callaghan, Casey (2010). “Experiencing 
Speech.” In: Philosophical Issues 20, pp. 305–332.  
Peacocke, Christopher (2001). “Does Perception Have a Nonconceptual Content?” In: Journal of Philosophy 
 98 
98.5, pp. 239–264. Price, Richard (2009). “Aspect-Switching and Visual Phenomenal Character.” In: 
Philosophical Quarterly 59.236, pp. 508–518.  
Pylyshyn, Zenon. W. (1999). “Is Vision Continuous with Cognition? The Case for Cognitive Impenetrability 
of Visual Perception.” In: Behavioral and Brain Science 22.3, pp. 341–365.  
Raftopoulos, Athanassios (2009). Cognition and Perception: How Do Psychology and Neural Science Inform 
Philosophy? MIT Press.  
Scholl, Brian J. and Alan M. Leslie (1999). “Modularity, Development and Theory of Mind”.” In: Mind and 
Language 14.1, pp. 131–153.  
Siegel, Susanna (2006). “Which Properties Are Represented in Perception?” In: Perceptual Experience. Ed. by 
Tamar S. Gendler and John Hawthorne. Oxford University Press, pp. 481–503. – (2007). “How Can 
We Discover the Contents of Experience?” In: The 
Southern Journal of Philosophy XLV, pp. 127–142.  
–––– (2010). The Contents of Visual Experience. Oxford University Press.  
–––– (2016). “The Contents of Perception.” In: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Ed. by Edward 
N. Zalta. Winter 2016. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.  
Siewert, Charles (1998). The Significance of Consciousness. Princeton University Press.  
Silins, Nicholas (2013). “The significance of high-level content.” In: Philosophical Studies 162, pp. 13–33.  
Sorensen, Roy (2013). “The Twin Towers Riddle.” In: Philosophical Studies 162, pp. 109–117. Stokes, Daniel 
(2013). “Cognitive Penetrability of Perception.” In: Philosophy Compass 8.7. 
Stokes, Dustin (2015). “Towards a Consequentialist Understanding of Cognitive Penetration.” In: Cognitive 
Penetrability (Oxford University Press). Ed. by A. Raftopoulos and J. Zeimbekis. 
Tye, Michael (2000). Consciousness, Color, and Content. MIT Press.  
Wu, Wayne (2013). “Visual Spatial Constancy and Modularity: Does Intention Penetrate Vision?” In: 
Philosophical Studies 165.2, pp. 647–669.  
Zeimbekis, John (2013). “Color and Cognitive Penetrability.” In: Philosophical Studies 165.1, pp. 167–175. 
 
